

THE EASTERN CHURCHES QUARTERLY

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CONTENTS

	<i>pages</i>
THE CHARACTER OF THE THEOLOGICAL DIVERGENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST <i>Rev. Gervase Mathew, O.P.</i>	225
ST. AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF GRACE <i>Dom Aelred Graham</i>	228
THE ORTHODOX CHURCH'S TEACHING OF GRACE <i>Dr. E. Lampert</i>	248
ST. BONAVENTURE ON THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY <i>Professor Hilary Armstrong</i>	258
THE THEOLOGICAL TEACHING OF GREGORY PALAMAS ON THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY <i>Dom Clement Lialine</i>	266
APPENDIX - - - - -	287

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THE SACRED COLLEGE OF CARDINALS

WE rejoice that the Holy Father has chosen at this time to proclaim to the world that the Church is supranational, and this in the centre of her unity—Rome. The Sacred College of Cardinals will now show forth this fact in a conspicuous way.

We offer our respectful congratulations and the assurances of our prayers especially to Cardinal Griffin, Archbishop of Westminster; to Cardinal Spellman, Archbishop of New York, who, as President of the Catholic Near East Welfare Association, shows an interest in the *E.C.Q.*, and to Cardinal Gregorius Petrus XV Agagianian, Armenian Patriarch of Cilicia, who with Cardinal Patriarch Tappouni will represent the Eastern Rites in the Sacred College. *Ad multos annos!*

THE EASTERN CHURCHES QUARTERLY CONFERENCE.

BLACKFRIARS, OXFORD, OCTOBER 5th—7th, 1945.

Friday, October 5th.

- 8 p.m. The Character of Theological Divergence
 between East and West.
Speaker: The Rev. Gervase Mathew, O.P.
Chairman: The Very Rev. Daniel Callus, O.P.

Saturday, October 6th.

- 9 a.m. Dialogue Mass at Blackfriars.
2.30 p.m. St. Augustine on Grace.
 Speaker: Dom Aelred Graham.
 Chairman: Rev. M. Bevenot, S.J.
8 p.m. The Orthodox Church's Conception of Grace.
 Speaker: Dr. E. Lampert (Orthodox).
 Chairman: Rev. Victor White, O.P.

Sunday, October 7th.

9.45 a.m. Dialogue Mass at the Old Palace, St. Aldate's.

11.30 a.m. St. Bonaventure on the Divine Simplicity.

Speaker: Professor Hilary Armstrong.

Chairman: Rev. E. L. Mascall (Anglican).

2.30 p.m. The Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas
on Divine Simplicity.

Speaker: Dom Clement Lialine (Editor of
Irenikon).

Chairman: Rev. P. J. Thompson (Anglican).

In the Conference of 1944, we laid the foundations for an approach to the question of the reunion of East and West, liturgical, historical and theological. At this Conference we examined in some detail one of the questions that had been raised in 1944, viz., the doctrine of grace, which was also considered in the wider view of God in his dealings with mankind. We think the treatment of the subject was fully justified; the attendance was far better than the previous year and the number of Anglican clergy who attended was very gratifying; among the Orthodox [only two or three] who were present was the Archimandrite Nicolas Gibbs; the Dominican Fathers were regular in their attendance and also some Catholic nuns who were up at the University, besides a good number of lay people. There was a good deal of useful discussion which has led to many suggestions for next year's meeting. One feels that the Conference has become vital and one is exceeding grateful.

This issue is entirely given over to the papers of the Conference, but on the last page (an appendix) will be found reference to the next issue and acknowledgments of books and reviews received.

THE EDITOR.

ABSTRACT OF THE LECTURE ON THE CHARACTER OF THE THEOLOGICAL DIVERGENCE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

By the REV. GERVASE MATHEW, O.P., M.A., S.T.L.

IT was suggested that any attempt to discuss the character of the theological divergence between Latin and Greek writers must be both cautious and tentative; the evidence is fragmentary and at times apparently contradictory. Fresh discoveries are continually being made, and much manuscript material is known to exist which has not yet been edited or explored.

The subject of the lecture implies three distinct problems :

- I. The existence of theological divergence between western and eastern Christianity in the pre-Nicene period.
- II. The character of such divergence in post-Nicene patristic speculation.
- III. The relation between the mediaeval theological movements in the West and in the Byzantine sphere.

I. The lecturer suggested that there was no satisfactory evidence of any theological divergence between the eastern and western provinces of the Empire in the pre-Nicene period. Such divisions as may legitimately be made in pre-Nicene patristics do not coincide with any geographical boundaries though they at times seem to coincide with different social groupings within the same area.

The still current generalizations on the Latin characteristics of Tertullian's thought seem without foundation. Tertullian was bi-lingual, writing in Greek as readily as in Latin, utilizing Greek sources, discussing common problems. He seems a characteristic product of that mixed "megalopolitan" culture of the third century Mediterranean world.

There are passages both in the "Octavius" and in the writings of Cyprian which could hardly have been composed east of Cyrene, but these passages do not deal with theological speculations.

It was suggested that this absence of any divergence was perhaps due to the fundamental unity of Graeco-Roman culture among the literate classes during the first three centuries of the Empire.

II. In contrast, there is an obvious divergence between the forms and subjects of speculation current among Greek and Latin theologians of the late fourth and fifth and sixth centuries. It cannot be only a coincidence that Soteriology and the disputes on Predestination and on the *vulnera* of original sin so little concerned the late Greek Fathers. In the fourth century Ambrose, Hilary, Victorinus Afer are the three among the Latins to be most integrally affected by contemporary Greek speculation. Yet an already existent divergence can be illustrated by a comparison between the sixth section of Ambrose's *De Mysteriis* and the sixth section of the *Catechetical Oration* of Gregory of Nyssa, by an analysis of the quality of the dependence of Ambrose's *Homily on Naboth's Vineyard*, upon the sixth and seventh homilies of Basil, by the fate of the purely Greek elements in Hilary's *De Trinitate* and by the contrast between the conceptions of the rôle of reason in theology implied in the third section of the *Catechetical Oration* and the first book of Afer's *Adversus Arium*.

This divergence coincides with the gradual de-hellenization of the western provinces throughout the fourth century and with the conscious revival among the literate of the ideals and standards of the late Republic and of the Julio-Claudian principate ; both facts emphasized by the imperial programme as to the functions of the "artes liberales" which culminates in the legislation of Valentinian I. The gradual acceptance of such a programme by Christian writers from the time of Lactantius is perhaps a main cause of the divergence. Much of fourth century Christian Latin literature derives from Cicero and from Seneca, just as much of fourth century Christian Greek literature derives from the middle-Platonists and from the rhetoricians of the Second Sophistic. In spite of the presence of variants of Stoic theory in both groups of sources, this led to a divergence in postulates upon the subject of ethics and upon the functions of the individual. It was suggested that this divergence in ethical theory was the real cause of the apparent divergence between eastern and western theories upon Grace.

III. Throughout the post-patristic period, the Greek and Latin traditions in theological speculation sporadically fertilize each other. Three examples were chosen :

(a) The influence of the translations from Gregory of Nyssa, pseudo-Dionysios and Maximus upon the late Caro-

lingian theological renaissance. The scope of that influence was illustrated by an analysis of the meanings that then became attached to the terms *theoria theologica*, *supernaturale*, *intelligibilis*, and *sensualis*. The limitation of that influence, its misinterpretation and the causes of the misinterpretation were illustrated by an analysis of passages from Bibliothèque Nationale M.S. gr. 437 (ff. 16 seq.) and M.S. 15645 (ff. 53 seq.) and Laon M.S. gr. 444.

(b) The influence of Damascene, pseudo-Dionysios and the Cappadocian school upon the scholastic movement in the late twelfth and early thirteenth century. The extent of that influence was suggested by a comparison of the number of Christian Greek citations in the Book of the Sentences and of the *Summa*, by a description of the gradual "Byzantinization" of Victorine mystical theory, and by a study of the implications of the doctrine of Original Justice. The limitations of that influence and its frequent misinterpretation were illustrated by a study of the senses attributed to the technical terms in Damascene and by an analysis of Merton M.S. 69 (ff. 131 seq.) and of the glosses on Vat. M.S. gr. 370 (ff. 4 seq.).

(c) The influence of western scholasticism on Byzantine theological speculation of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth century. An attempt was made to list the Byzantine translations from Augustine and Aquinas and to discuss their provenance and influence. Reference was made to the mediaeval Western influence on Greek sacramental teaching and to some of the problems connected with Hesychast literature.

In conclusion it was emphasized that theological divergence does not necessarily imply doctrinal divergence. Theological divergence may have facilitated the schism; there is no evidence that it caused it. The new scientific study of Byzantine sources suggests that the "schism" was a gradual, fluctuating, disjointed process, perhaps not consummated till the end of the fifteenth century and perhaps only reaching its present shape about 150 years later.

ST. AUGUSTINE'S DOCTRINE OF GRACE

ST. AUGUSTINE'S doctrine of grace and sin was formulated independently of the Pelagian controversy. Its foundations were laid in his *De Libero Arbitrio*, where he starts from the favourite question of his former Manichean associates: "Whence comes evil?" This work was finished by approximately the year 395, after its author's return to Africa following upon the death of Monica in November 387. According to Harnack, "It can be said that his doctrine of grace, in so far as it was a doctrine of God, was complete as early as A.D. 387; but it was not, in its application to Bible history, or to the problem of conversion and sanctification (in the Church), before the beginning of the fifth century."¹ During the next decade Augustine was chiefly occupied in controversy with the Donatists, and it was not until 412, after Pelagius and his disciple Caelestius had crossed the sea from Sicily and propagated their teaching in Africa itself, that he intervened, no doubt at the instance of his Metropolitan, Aurelius of Carthage, first in sermons then in writings. A Council held at Carthage, 411-412, had condemned the doctrine of the Pelagian Caelestius and appears to have drawn up a number of counter-propositions to his own. It was doubtless with a view to popularizing the Conciliar teaching that Augustine first broached the matter in his public sermons. We may note in passing that among his anti-Pelagian arguments is to be found an interesting anticipation of the Thomist, as distinct from the Scotist, view of the reason for the Incarnation. "If man had not perished," he says, "the Son of Man would not have come."²

Before attempting to outline St. Augustine's theory of grace it is worth while to take a glance at the protagonists engaged in the Pelagian controversy; for they embody, as Harnack justly remarks: "The two great types of thought; involving the question whether virtue or grace, morality or religion, the original and inalienable constitution of man, or the power of Jesus Christ was supreme."³ There are the

¹ Harnack, *History of Dogma* (E.T.), Vol. V, p. 168.

² *Sermo*, clxxiv, §2 (*Op.* v. 831 b; *P.L.* xxxviii, 940); cf. St. Thos. Aq. *Summa*, III, i, 3. I owe the reference to Dr. Kidd, *A History of the Church*, Vol. III, p. 68.

³ Harnack, *Op. cit.*, p. 169.

elements of an eternal conflict in these opposing viewpoints, and we are fortunate in having the issue stated in historical terms by two such men as Augustine and Pelagius. The conflict was dramatic indeed, since the points at issue were of the highest human importance; with the exception of the Arian controversy before the Nicene Council there has been nothing to compare with it in vital interest to the Church. But if Augustine was the hero, in that he saved the Catholic doctrine of grace from being perverted into the stoical ethic of a by no means out-moded paganism, there was no villain of the piece. Though he saw Pelagius's teaching to be rooted in pride and self-sufficiency, he more than once, with characteristic magnanimity, pays tribute to the man. No breath of scandal ever sullied the name of Pelagius; he was an active and zealous Christian, deeply concerned to uphold the Church's moral standards. The polemic on the whole, despite occasional lapses into personalities and recrimination, was conducted on an exemplary high level. Nor have we any grounds for impugning the motives of Pelagius's two chief supporters, Caelestius and Julian, Bishop of Eclanum (417-†454); though Marius Mercator remarks upon the former's "incredible loquacity," by which "he made many persons partakers of his infatuation," and Augustine found the latter, to quote his own words, "a very confident young man."

The "personal equation" in the Pelagian debate cannot be ignored. If, in modern times, the characteristic teaching of Luther and Kierkegaard is largely a transcription of their own experience, the same is true of Augustine, as it was also perhaps of St. Paul. The Augustinian doctrine of grace is a theology of conversion, of its author's being uplifted by God's hand from the depths of sensuality to become himself a monument of divine favour freely bestowed. The eighth book of the *Confessions* puts before us in autobiographical terms the drama of an individual's salvation; we witness in the soul of the greatest of the western Fathers the conquest of sin by what seemed to him an irresistible outpouring of gracious light and strength. "Not in rioting and drunkenness, not in chambering and impurities, not in contention and envy. But put ye on the Lord Jesus Christ: and make no provision for the flesh and its concupiscences."¹ So had he read in the Epistle to the Romans; and he adds: "No further would I read, nor was it necessary. As I reached

¹ *Romans* xiii, 13-14.

the end of the sentence, the light of peace seemed to be shed upon my heart, and every shadow of doubt melted away."¹

Pelagius and his disciples had known no such inner struggle as this. They were the champions of a vigorous practical Christianity, rejoicing in what they felt to be man's natural capacity for goodness and concerned to stimulate it to the utmost. They thought Augustine's depreciation of the will's natural powers to be spiritually enervating, his distrust of self and utter reliance upon God opening the way to laxity and moral lethargy. Pelagius was a monk and ascetic adorned with stoic virtues; he came, not from warm and sunlit Africa, but from temperate Britain, and found a life of rectitude well within his range; the depths of degradation into which Augustine felt himself to have fallen were doubtless as inaccessible to him as were the soaring heights of his mysticism. Before the outbreak of the controversy he had taken offence at St. Augustine's famous sentence: "*Da quod jubes et jube quod vis.*"² Caelestius, likewise a monk, won over by Pelagius in Rome, was also constitutionally incapacitated from entering into the viewpoint of his opponent, though for a different reason. He was *naturae vitio eunuchus matris utero editus*. Julian of Eclanum, perhaps the ablest controversialist on the Pelagian side, unlike the two members of the trio just mentioned, was an unsatisfactory character. He was a widower and an overbearing worldly bishop, full of vanity and lacking in seriousness. Harnack describes him as "the first, and up to the sixteenth century, the unsurpassed, unabashed representative of a self-satisfied Christianity."³

Two other observations are worth making before passing on to what is the main purpose of this paper. The first is that the whole dispute was a purely theological one; that is to say, the appeal on both sides was to the Creeds, Scripture and revealed truth, and not to natural philosophy. Augustine was of course a philosopher and metaphysician of the first order; but he is concerned fundamentally with the essence of Christianity; hence he regards Pelagianism not merely as error but as *heresy*. Pelagius and his friends, on the other hand, were always convinced that the disputed questions, while extremely important, were not dogmatic. The most that was involved was theological error. Which is sufficient proof of how short-sighted they were in comparison with

¹ *Confessions* viii, 12.

² *De dono persever.*, 53.

³ Harnack, *Op. cit.*, p. 171.

Augustine. Finally the controversy over grace was almost wholly confined to the Western Church. It is true that Pelagius went to Palestine, but difficulties of language as well as differences in theological outlook, prevented the oriental theologians from appreciating what the dispute was all about. It has been suggested that in the East there were perhaps not a dozen Christians who really disapproved of Pelagianism.¹ Between it and Nestorianism there were, as has often been remarked, close affinities; "the Nestorian Christ," it has been fairly said, "is a worthy saviour of the Pelagian man." Nestorius himself did in fact give a welcome to the Pelagians Caelestius and Julian at Constantinople. But it was the association of Caelestius with the heretical Patriarch which led to the joint condemnation of their teaching at the Council of Ephesus, and not, it would seem, any serious preoccupation of the conciliar Fathers with Pelagianism as such.

* * * * *

Let us now return to St. Augustine and his doctrine of grace. We have however to take note that, along with grace, there are two other factors inextricably interlinked, viz., human liberty and sin. Grace works with the former and is a corrective of the latter; so that it is not surprising that we should find the Augustinian teaching on grace closely connected with his conception of man's freedom and his power of doing evil.² But we must not conceive of grace as being merely a function of evil, to which it provides the remedy. There is in man a radical unsufficiency, in consequence of which his desires and actions are disordered, and to that extent bad. By contrast with God, who is the Sovereign Good, the immutable eternal self-existent Being, we have been *created*, that is, drawn out of nothingness. Whence it follows that we are compounded not only of being, but also, in a sense, of non-being. In us there is a sort of original flaw, a lack of something which we must strive to acquire; hence, unlike God, we are condemned to fluctuation and change. This was a truth that St. Augustine had learnt from Plato, who saw that things cannot, absolutely speaking, be said to be or not to be: *nec omnino esse nec omnino non esse*.³ The

¹ Harnack, *Op. cit.*, p. 188.

² What follows is greatly indebted, both for the lines of the exposition and for references to texts, to Étienne Gilson, *Introduction à L'Étude de Saint Augustin* (Paris 1929); in particular, pp. 177-210.

³ *Confessions*, VII, 11, 17.

difficulty is to elucidate the precise relationship between being and non-being in each particular case.

The solution is to be found in considering those universal attributes in virtue of which created things may be said to be good. Now whatever substance we contemplate, whether spiritual or corporeal, we see that God has conferred on it measure, form and order (*modus, species, ordo*). The higher the degree of these perfections the nobler will be the creature possessing them; and contrariwise, the less they are in evidence the lower will be the creature in the scale of being. In whatever exists these perfections must be present, however obscurely; if they are not there at all then they correspond to nothing, *nulla natura*. It is from this argument that Augustine concludes that, since all nature consists in three perfections, all nature is good by definition.

What then is evil? It is the corruption of one or other of these perfections in the nature which possesses them. An evil nature is bad in exact proportion to the degree in which its measure, form and order have been corrupted. Evil is thus not a positive entity, but a privation of good; not, be it noted, a mere negation, but the absence of something which should be there. This is the principle which Augustine applies to the evil, that is sinful, human will. A voluntary and free act can be compared in effect to a substance endowed with measure, form and order. When these perfections are not what they ought to be in a given act, it is imperfect and to that extent bad. But here again the malice lies in privation; a bad will is thus a will which, as such, is good, but lacking the fulness of being which it should have; here, as elsewhere, evil presupposes goodness—it is a negation, or more accurately, a privation rather than anything positive.

These principles, grown familiar to every student of Catholic theology, were laid down by St. Augustine in order to vindicate the goodness of the Creator. God is not to be blamed for the evil existing in the world, since there is nothing in it which can be ascribed to Him. But as yet we are only at the beginning of our problem. The question at once arises: If man's actions are not always what they should be, is it not his own will that is responsible? He makes his decisions freely and, as a free creature, he is capable of doing ill. How then comes it that a perfect God should have endowed us with free choice, that is, with a will capable of sinning? Put in another way the problem is this: to what extent is free choice

to be regarded as a benefit at all? Augustine's answer here is an application of his general theory with regard to natural objects. Good things can be put to ill-use; the human body, for example, can be abused; but that does not take away its inherent goodness. Why should it not be the same way with our power of choice? Considered in itself human liberty is good, since without it we should be incapable of leading the good life. It comes from God, and if we use it ill we have only ourselves to blame. Sinners themselves contribute to the perfection of the universe; not, however, as *sinners*, but as beings endowed with free will, capable of sinning or of not sinning.¹

Thus far does Augustine's dialectic carry him, in his application to human liberty of principles to which we may take no exception when applied to things of the merely physical order. Is it too abstract, too ruthless in its consistency? Some have thought so; and we may perhaps admit that this prince of theologians, for all his reverence of the divine mysteries, could occasionally press home his conclusions with too categorical an emphasis. Is not the subsequent modification of his teaching by the mind of the Church on predestination and the fate of the unbaptized a corroboration of this? But to return to the point at issue. May it not still be asked whether to endow us with a will capable of wrongdoing is not to make us a present so dangerous as to constitute in itself a veritable evil? It is true that liberty is a perilous gift, but it is nevertheless the indispensable condition of the highest good that can fall to our lot, Beatitude. In itself free will cannot be an evil; but, on the other hand, since it can be abused, it is not an absolute good; it is a sort of middle-good, of which the nature is sound, but whose effects can be good or bad according to the use we make of it.²

Still the question persists: what is the origin of sin? Everything of goodness comes from God; all nature in so far as it exists is good; therefore all nature has God for its author. Now, as we have seen, a sinful will is such because it is lacking in goodness. It becomes then a contradiction in terms to ascribe to a positive cause, which God is, the origin of that movement of aversion by which the will turns itself away from Him. Undoubtedly He has created it master of itself and capable either of attaching itself to, or detaching

¹ Cf. *Enchiridion*, 96, 24; *De lib. arbit.*, III, 9, 26.

² *De lib. arb.*, III, 19, 50; cf. *Retract.*, I, 9, 6.

itself from, the Sovereign Good; the will thus created is *able* to turn itself from God, even though it should not. Its fall, for that is what is now in question, has not about it the fatal inevitability of a dropping stone, it is the free collapse of the self-abandoned will; there is, as it were, a want of willing in the act of willing. Fundamentally we are concerned simply with a defect, a lack of order, and consequently a lack of being. As well look for a positive cause of silence or of darkness as look for a positive cause of sin. It is true, as we know only too well, that sin is itself an effective agent of further evil; but this happens not through efficient causality (which must always be positive) but owing to a *defect* in the will which henceforth mars all its actions. What is the nature of this defect? It is the absence of the love of God. Here at last we are on the threshold of grace. The human will, a created thing and therefore imperfect, has only to allow itself to fall from the Creator to creatures to introduce within itself and in the whole universe the primal disorder of sin. To repair this disaster, for which He is in no way responsible, God comes to our aid. He stretches out His hand, as it were, to fallen man to raise him up and restore, by the gift of grace, that primitive order which sin has destroyed.

* * * * *

God, being the Sovereign Good, is sufficient unto Himself; it is then freely and gratuitously that He gives each of His gifts, and in this sense there is none of His works that is not a "grace." Broadly speaking, all nature, since it has no claim to existence, manifests the grace of God. Man especially so, for he is made in the image of his Creator. But far above this we find a grace of another sort: not that by which the eternal Word has made us men, but that whereby the Incarnate Word has made certain men to be His faithful: *non quod per Verbum homines creati sumus, sed quod per Verbum carnem factum fideles facti sumus*.¹ This is grace properly so called.

Being absolutely free in His creative act, God was able, had He so willed, to create man in the state in which we now find him. Both in the *De Libero Arbitrio* and the *Retractiones*, Augustine teaches that if God had created us as we are—creatures ignorant indeed, but able by the light of reason to clarify the darkness and strong enough in will to acquire virtue—*nec sic culpandus, sed laudandus esset Deus*.² But in

¹ *Sermo* 26; V, 6.

² *Retract.*, I, 9, 6; cf. *De lib. arbit.*, III, 20, 56.

actual fact this was not God's plan. The state in which man was created was immeasurably superior to that which we now enjoy. Before the Fall man led a life whose very essence was the peaceful and effortless love of God. This being so, he committed no sin; being sinless, he was not subject to evil, immune from suffering and sadness. In a word, he was incorruptible and immortal—*summa in carne sanitas, in anima tota tranquillitas*. Owing to the supernatural clarity of his mind, he was exempt from the ignorance and error, themselves the result of sin, of which we are now the victims.

Here the interesting and important question arises: what was St. Augustine's conception of man's *natural* state? Later theologians, most notably St. Thomas, have studied man in what we may call his metaphysical constitution, abstraction being made both from the endowments which come to him by supernatural grace and the injury he has suffered through sin. The significance of this viewpoint can hardly be over-estimated, for only by means of it can we appreciate precisely what has been gained by grace and lost through sin. But the fact remains that it does not seem ever to have been adopted by Augustine, either because he was not concerned with it or because he did not envisage the special problems involved. He is entirely concentrated upon man's concrete historical condition, whether it be in his state of innocence before the Fall, or as ruined by sin, or as redeemed by Christ. For him man's natural state is that in which he was first fashioned, involving the gift of grace: . . . *naturam, qualis sine vitio primitus condita erat: ipsa enim vere ac proprie natura hominis dicitur*.¹ Though he allows that, by a transferred use of the word, the state in which we are now born can be described as natural: *Translato autem verbo utimur, ut naturam dicamus etiam, qualis nascitur homo*.² But nowhere does he speak of what St. Thomas means by the *bonum naturae humanae*, viz., the constitutive principles of our nature and the properties flowing therefrom; of which it can be said that that *primum . . . bonum naturae nec tollitur nec diminuitur per peccatum*, "the essential good of nature is neither removed nor diminished by sin."³ For St. Augustine, on the contrary, quite consistently with his standpoint and terminology, man's nature could be, and was in fact, corrupted—for it consisted in nothing else than the order first established by God and subsequently destroyed through sin.

¹ *Retract.*, I, 10, 3.

² *Ibid.*

³ *Sum. theol.*, I-II, q. 85, a. 1.

Thus we find St. Augustine ascribing to grace all the gifts which originally constituted man. Created by God, as Scripture teaches,¹ in a state of rectitude, he enjoys the perfect subordination of the body to the spirit in virtue of a gratuitous gift of the Creator. The love itself, *amor imperturbatus*, whereby he adheres to God, which is the source of all his other privileges, belongs to him only by the generosity of a divine dispensation. What we now call sanctifying grace, viz., that infused quality by which He makes His creatures to become His children, is but the highest and most precious of His gifts. Finally, immortality, which man enjoys in the state of nature thus defined, is but another grace; for it is not even a necessary consequence of original righteousness, since man's immortality does not consist precisely in his not being able to die, but rather in his being able not to die by not separating himself from the tree of life, from which in fact he does sever himself through sin. In a word, immeasurably rich though he is, nothing that man has is his possession by right. We need not then be surprised at how much he has lost through sinning.

All that was asked of man as a condition of his retaining these gifts was that he should persevere; and nothing was easier for him than perseverance. Although Augustine does not expressly draw the distinction familiar to us between sanctifying grace and actual grace, he undoubtedly attributes the latter to man as God created him. To enable him to persevere in good Adam enjoyed the same sort of grace as is given to us as a means of keeping free from sin. The exact nature of the act of prevarication which so profoundly modified the original state of man is highly complex. On a superficial view it was the transgression of an order easy to respect. Adam had been prohibited from eating a certain fruit; he was bound by obedience, the virtue which, in a rational creature, is the mother and guardian of all the virtues. The forbidden fruit was meant as a pledge or symbol of man's obedience, it had no peculiarly seductive qualities of its own; nothing was easier than for Adam to pass it by in a garden where all manner of nourishment abounded. Moreover, he experienced no rebellion of the lower appetites against the spirit; for, since this is precisely the result of original sin, it could not be its cause. It is not then in the difficulty of the precept, nor in any fleshly insubordination, that the origin

¹ *Ecclesiastes*, VII, 30.

of evil lies, but solely in man's will and particularly in his pride; that is, in a perverse desire for independence.

Self-complacency, the wish to raise himself to a dignity not his own, wrong-headed self-confidence, this was what led man to desert the principle, namely God, to which he should ever have been attached, in order to rejoice in himself and become as it were his own principle. This act of rebellion was a spontaneous movement of a nature drawn by God out of nothingness, a movement—be it carefully noted—which had preceded the actual temptation; for the fateful promise that he would be like to God would not have ensnared Adam had he not already begun to take complacency in himself. So Augustine teaches in the *De Civitate Dei*.¹ This is the hidden evil which the external fault serves only to manifest; the pride of being a light unto himself, the refusal to remain turned towards the Light which should have enlightened him. The gravity of the offence is so profound that Adam himself is hardly aware of it. In place of self-detestation he begins at once to make excuse. "The woman, whom thou gavest me to be my companion, gave me of the tree, and I did eat";² pride seeks to thrust upon another the crime for which it is responsible. This voluntary transgression of God's command stands self-condemned in the very act of excusing itself.

The two consequences always associated by St. Augustine with the original Fall are *concupiscence* and *ignorance*. Augustinian scholars still debate the question whether the saint understood by concupiscence original sin itself or the consequences (*reatus*) which follow upon it. Texts may be quoted in support of either view; but we may surely agree with M. Gilson in holding that concupiscence is an irregularity consequent upon the pride of the will, which was itself the essence of Adam's sin. The opposing interpretations can be reconciled if we remember that, for Augustine, in the state of fallen nature, original sin cannot really be distinguished from the punishment involved in it . . . *peccatum originale sic peccatum est, ut ipsum sit et poena peccati*.³ Since God had excluded the

¹ XIV, 13, 2. St. Thomas, at least with regard to Eve, does not appear to share this view. Here, as elsewhere, he "interprets" St. Augustine:— . . . quod non est sic intelligendum, quasi superbia praecesserit suasionem serpentis, sed quia statim post suasionem serpentis invasit mentem ejus elatio, ex qua consecutum est, ut crederet verum esse quod daemon dicebat. *Summa* II-II, q. 163, art. 1, ad 4.

² *Genesis* III, 12.

³ Gilson, *Op. cit.*, p. 189, note 1.

vices of concupiscence and ignorance from human nature as originally constituted, it follows that, by Adam's transgression, nature was changed for the worse. In place of the knowledge which the first man possessed without having to acquire it, he is oppressed by ignorance from which he can free himself only with difficulty; instead of enjoying the soul's mastery over the body, he must submit to the revolt of the flesh against the spirit. For Augustine these disorders are themselves sins, as was the act from which they proceed; they are even elements of original sin, as prolonging itself in the consequences which it has engendered.

What then, according to St. Augustine, is man's condition after the Fall? His nature which was once good is now vitiated and vicious, and to this extent evil. Nevertheless, original human nature was not completely destroyed; for this to have happened it would have to cease to exist; as long as it is in being at all it is to that extent good. We still possess life and the power of reproducing the species; we have thought also, which, though greatly obscured, remains capable of knowing the truth and loving the good and laboriously acquiring the arts and sciences and even the virtues. This is shown by the fact that the pagans can give proof of fortitude, temperance, justice and prudence. These are vestiges of the original order, now destroyed, the ruins upon which a restoration can be made—and which God has preserved precisely for this object. It must not be forgotten, however, that these relics of goodness are themselves God's gifts. As He confers upon the whole of creation all being and all activity, it is He who safeguards in fallen man the power of achieving the least virtuous action; every good use of free will is traceable to Him; left to ourselves we have nothing but the power of doing evil: *Nemo habet de suo nisi mendacium atque peccatum*.¹ Moreover, such remnants of virtue as remain in us have no value at all for acquiring eternal salvation. From this ultimate point of view they are sterile and indeed can easily become but splendid vices. This happens when man ascribes the merit of them to himself, being guilty of self-glorification. The only legitimate end for human activity is God; even seemingly praiseworthy actions when not directed to that end are in reality vicious. This is one of St. Augustine's themes in the *De Civitate Dei*; *Quod non possint ibi verae esse virtutes, ubi non est vera religio*.²

Rare and precious then is natural virtue ; it can only recover its primitive supernatural value when this is given to it by God, by that special assistance adopted to our fallen nature which we call grace.

This is grace in the strict and proper sense as we now understand it. If St. Augustine does not clearly distinguish between grace and man's original state, he sees a radical distinction between it and fallen nature. Grace so understood comprises the gratuitous gifts of God whereby man's salvation is rendered possible in the condition in which we now find him ; it is a divine endowment of perverted human nature. Its function is not to constitute in the first place God's handiwork—though this, as we have seen, can be called a “grace,” in that it is a free gift ; but to re-establish it in putting to rights a disorder for which man himself, and he only, has been responsible. In other words, the essential characteristic of grace so understood is that it is supernatural by definition. By this title it is wholly to be distinguished from the universal divine *concursus* by which God gives being to creatures, both in their existence and in their activities. We may call these graces if we like, since they are certainly God's gratuitous gifts to which we have no claim ; but they are on an entirely lower plane from that special gift whereby God renders to man what he has lost through the Fall. At his creation he had been adopted as a son of God ; this status he forfeited through sin. Thereafter nothing that he did could be worth anything in the divine eyes. For his actions to recover the least worth, it was needful that God should ascribe precisely this value to them ; and this is what He did by grace, through the merits of Jesus Christ. Just as the original constitution of nature demanded the creative power of God, so did its re-establishment—a virtual re-creation—likewise demand it. Man of himself was helpless, except to do evil. Created by God in His image and likeness, he had lost through his own fault these sublime gifts ; to regain them on his own account man would have had *per impossibile* to be God Himself. The only alternative was that God should decide, from His boundless generosity, to restore them to us. We have now to ask what is the measure of this giving of grace ?

St. Augustine treats of this obscure matter in his *De diversis quaestionibus ad Simplicianum*. Take first the case of those who lived after the Fall and before the promulgation of the Jewish Law. These generations of men lived in sin without even

being aware of it. Blinded by Adam's sin to what was their supreme good, yet not warned of their unhappy state by the Law, they followed after fleshly desires because they knew no better. The effect of the divinely promulgated Law was to give men knowledge of their own culpability. The Law came, neither to introduce sin into the world, for it was already there, nor to extirpate it, since for that grace was needed ; its purpose was to give man a realization both of his guilt and of his need for grace. The gravity of sin became clear in the light of the divine prohibition. He who lives under the reign of the Law remains a slave of the concupiscence engendered by sin ; he knows himself dominated by it ; he knows also that it is forbidden him ; and yet he yields ; it is only grace which, over and above the knowledge of the Law, gives him the power to fulfil it.

The acquirement of grace is thus for man a necessary condition of salvation. Some men have imagined that they can acquire grace in virtue of their good works ; but in this they greatly err. Grace would not be freely given, that is, it would no longer be grace, if it were possible to merit it : *eo ipso quo gratia est evangelica, operibus non debetur : alioquin gratia jam non est gratia.*¹ The means of acquiring grace is by faith. Faith therefore preceded good works ; not that it dispenses with or suppresses them ; on the contrary, good works are the logical issue of faith. In other words, no one should think that he has received faith on account of his good works, but rather that he could not achieve any good work unless, along with faith, he has received grace. Man receives grace at the moment when, through an intimation coming either from within or from without, he begins to believe in God. This new life is first conceived in the mind, then, being born within the soul, it grows and develops according to its own laws.

If then grace preceded both our good works and our merits, if it can never be regarded as a personal achievement, it follows that it is the result of an election, a choice, on the part of God. What is the motive of this choice ? Certainly nothing existing in creatures ; for they have no claim to elicit the divine election. The only escape from this difficulty is to say that, since God's choosing cannot be based upon justice, that is, the creature's right to be so chosen, He first of all confers justice by choosing him who is to receive grace. Put another way. since election

¹ *De Diversis quaest. ad Simplic., I, 2 ; 2.*

cannot precede justification, it follows that justification precedes election. But here our problem is only pushed back a further stage. What, we may ask, is the motive of this justification? Are we to answer: it is faith? But faith is itself a grace, and therefore presupposes the justification we are attempting to explain. Can we then say that God justifies some and rejects others because He foresees the good or bad works they will accomplish? This will not do; because on such an hypothesis the future merits would be the cause of grace, while we know the contrary to be the fact: grace itself is the only conceivable cause of merit. Perhaps then we might ascribe justification to a *concursum* between God who calls and the good will which responds to His appeal. Again, this is no solution, for the reason that it is the divine choice which makes the will of the elect to be good. Thus the problem grows in complexity: the question is to know, not merely why God justifies A rather than B, but why certain men among those called do not respond to the divine appeal; since we know, on the words of Scripture, that many are called but few chosen.

Here, as must be evident, we are on the borders of the Augustinian doctrine of divine predestination. Beyond its borders we do not propose to enter. Suffice it to remark that St. Augustine's last word on this most agonizing of problems is an avowal of ignorance. *O altitudo!* We cannot know. Nevertheless it remains absolutely certain that in God there is nothing of blind and ruthless power, no merely arbitrary exercise of the will. Everything is judged by a transcendent equity beyond our human ken; *aequitate occultissima et ab humanis sensibus remotissima judicat*. Furthermore, Augustine is equally confident that the divine predestination, for all its infallible certainty, involves no diminution of human liberty. But here we are faced with a question, perhaps the most celebrated of all, highly relevant to our subject, and not therefore to be so easily passed over. How do the acts performed under the influence of grace preserve their character of freedom?

By way of a preliminary answer let us begin with the illuminating comment of M. Gilson. "What is generally considered to be the most formidable problem arising from the Augustinian doctrine of grace is that of its reconciliation with free will. Now it is literally exact to say that, from the point of view of St. Augustine himself, this problem does not

exist."¹ We have a will and, by definition, it is free ; free will is thus a fact, a *datum*. It is true that our free choices are always motived, and some motives can move the will irresistibly, but free will is essentially a choice exercised in the light of motives. A falling stone does not fall without a cause, but it falls without a motive ; a will which acted without a motive would be, on the other hand, a contradiction in terms. For Augustine the question is not whether we have free will. This he takes for granted. He is not even concerned with the problem of what the will's choice should be ; for he knows that this can only be the love of God. What he asks himself is, not whether the love of God is the proper object of our will, but *whether it is within our power*. Now the power to do what one chooses to do is more than free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), it is liberty (*libertas*). Thus there is no problem of grace and free will in St. Augustine, but there is a problem of grace and liberty.

It is on this latter question that we find him involved in the Pelagian controversy. The anti-Pelagian treatises were the occasion of his working out in detail the implications of a doctrine which he had held from the moment of his conversion. Fundamentally Pelagius's position, as Augustine saw it, was this : Sin, being no more than a wrong use of free will, diminished neither its liberty nor its natural goodness, nor its power to do good. Accordingly grace does not bear upon the will itself which, not being corrupt, has no need of it ; it is simply God's pardon of the offence done to Him by evil actions. He does not give grace as one enabling an otherwise impotent will to act as it should, but as a judge pardoning and remitting a fault. From this there follows a complete transformation of the Christian doctrine of redemption. As the will remains intact after the Fall, every man comes into the world in the primitive state of innocence enjoyed by Adam. Humanity, therefore, not having fallen, stands in no need of justification, except with regard to the remission of its offences. The sacrifice of Christ, though admittedly a striking demonstration of God's infinite goodness and a powerful inspiration to good for each individual man, does not touch the will itself and effects simply the remission of sins : *sola remissio peccatorum*.² As nothing had been corrupted in us, there was consequently no room for a process of restoration and re-creation.

¹ Gilson, *Op. cit.*, p. 198.

² *De gratia et lib. arbitrio*, XIV, 27.

We need not be surprised that Augustine reacted against this position with the utmost vehemence. But although he puts his case with all the eloquence and dialectical force of the consummate rhetorician that he was, with an occasional extravagance of statement to the apparent detriment of human freedom, his essential doctrine remains unchanged. He had in fact refuted Pelagianism in advance, before the outbreak of the controversy, as he himself remarks in the *Retractiones*.¹ Pelagius held that there was no need for the intervention of grace to prevent sin; its function was to efface sin after it had been committed. The will, free to obey the Law or not as it chose, could in fact always obey it. Everything in Augustine's experience cried out that this was untrue. For years he had known the Law and yet been unable to fulfil it. He had seen it obeyed by others, and longed to imitate them, but could not. Not in the philosophers, but in the reading of St. Paul, had he found the way out from his despair: "Unhappy man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? The grace of God, by Jesus Christ our Lord."²

St. Augustine saw that, as long as the will counts on itself to do good, it remains impotent. From the nature of things the will could not give itself the necessary power. It must then receive it from elsewhere. Thanks to the sacrifice of Christ, there comes to it the needful succour, divine and supernatural, whereby the Law becomes realizable for the human will. Thus the essence of Pelagianism was to misconceive the necessity for grace. It is sometimes said that, in his anti-Pelagian polemic, Augustine exaggerated the power of grace at the expense of the will's native energies; but it should be remembered that his essential doctrine was formulated in the *Confessions*, which were written some ten years before the Pelagian controversy began. *Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis*;³ "Give what Thou commandest, and command what Thou wilt." All that he says subsequently is but an application and development of this theme. To the Pelagian thesis Augustine consistently opposes the following proposition: "Neither the knowledge of the divine Law, nor nature, nor the mere remission of sins constitutes grace; grace is given to us by Jesus Christ our Lord, so that, by means of it, the Law may be fulfilled, nature delivered and sin vanquished."⁴ But he holds as no less certain that the uplifting effected by

¹ I, 9, 6.³ *Confessions* X, 29, 40.² *Romans* VII, 24-25.⁴ *De Gratia et lib. arbitrio* XIV, 27.

grace leaves free will completely intact. The will's power of choice is one of God's gifts and it is impossible to exclude it without at the same time abolishing the will itself, and consequently grace as well, for then it would have nothing on which to work. The difference between the man who has grace and the man who has not does not depend on the possession or non-possession of free will, but upon the will's efficacy. Those without grace recognize that they cannot will the good, or if they will it, it is as something beyond their reach; those who have it, on the other hand, both will the good and achieve it. Grace then may be defined as that which confers on the will the strength both to will the good and to do it. Now this twofold power is what St. Augustine means by *liberty*.

If it be asked what becomes of the human will under this close subjection to grace, the answer can be stated in a sentence. It conserves its power of free choice (*liberum arbitrium*), while it *acquires* liberty (*libertas*). "What has thou that thou hast not received?" But among the things we have received is our will, and consequently the capacity to choose. When God gives us the power of willing and the help we need to carry out His commandments, it is nevertheless the will itself which wills and does what He commands. *Qui ergo fecit te sine te, non te justificat sine te. Ergo fecit nescientem, justificat volentem.*¹ The will suffers no violence, loses nothing of its true nature, under the victorious pressure of grace. The will's motive force, for St. Augustine, is love, or, as he calls it, "delectation." A sort of inner weight (*pondus*) draws the will to one choice rather than another, and this movement is synonomous with freedom. Whatever the object of our delight, be it good or bad, we delight in it freely. The effect of grace within us is to substitute for delectation in evil a delight in the good. The Law, impracticable for our will in man's fallen state, becomes for the soul in grace an object of love and delectation. Charity is nothing but this love of God and His justice; once it is infused into the soul by grace, man begins to find joy in what was hitherto an object of distaste. Here we may note in passing that Cornelius Jansen later interpreted the Augustinian *delectatio* so as to give to actions performed under the influence of grace a sense of being determined from without, thereby excluding the will's liberty. He fell into this mistake, M. Gilson suggests,²

¹ *Sermo* 169, XI, 13.

² *Op. cit.*, 204-205.

through overlooking the fact that, for Augustine, the will and its delectation are, in the concrete, one and the same activity. Jansen regarded the delectation as the *cause* of the act of volition, and hence something outside it; whereas, according to St. Augustine, delectation is but another name for the love immanent within the will, its *pondus*, whence precisely arises its freedom.

Now, as delectation so understood is nothing but the will's movement towards its object, it follows that the man who is dominated by passion will inevitably prefer sin rather than grace. In this sense it is true to say that we must always do what attracts us most: *quod enim amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est.*¹ But it would be a mistake to suppose that the delectation which prevails abolishes the will's freedom; on the contrary, it manifests it. The delight in sin which tempts me is not something superadded to the will, drawing me to evil; rather it is the spontaneity of my thought in its movement towards sin. The delectation substituted by grace, contrariwise, is likewise not a force doing me violence, as it were, from within. It is again a spontaneous movement of the will, now transformed and made free, which henceforth tends entirely towards God. We are truly free when we act in such a way that the liberty arising from grace is the object of our delight.

Thus, for Augustine, liberty (*libertas*) results from the good use of free will (*liberum arbitrium*). If the will is always free, as it is, in the sense of *liberum arbitrium*, it is not always good, and consequently is not always free in the sense of *libertas*. That we do not always enjoy liberty is due to one cause—sin. When men enquire whether the will can love God by its own natural powers, they are in reality asking whether man's will suffices to re-establish the order created by divine omnipotence. What Pelagius unwittingly taught was that man was capable of a work which, from the nature of the case, God alone could do. A new creation was demanded; therefore the intervention of the original Creator was called for. This was what took place when He conferred grace upon us. In restoring to our souls the love of God which Adam had, God gives us also something of his domination over the body and material things. Far from abolishing our will, God makes it a *good* will; He liberates it. From free will, always essentially intact, He fashions liberty.

¹ *Epist., ad Gal., 49.*

When we remember that, in the thought of St. Augustine, liberty is to be identified with the efficacy of the free will towards the good, and that the proper function of grace is to confer this efficacy, we see that, not only is there no opposition between grace and liberty, but that it is only through grace that liberty can be attained. The more the will is subject to grace the freer it is. The supreme degree of liberty is to be entirely subject to God: *illo solo dominante, liberimus*.¹ This is what we find in complete allegiance to Christ: *libertas vera est Christo servire*.² Here, as in so much else, Augustine joins hands with St. Paul: "For when you were the servants of sin, you were free men to justice. What fruit therefore had you then in those things of which you are now ashamed? For the end of them is death. But now being made free from sin and become servants to God, you have your fruit unto sanctification, and the end life everlasting."³ To sum up: all comes to us from God; we have nothing to offer Him in return save His own gifts to us. "For what distinguisheth thee? Or what has thou that thou hast not received? And if thou has received it, why dost thou glory, as if thou hadst not received it?"⁴ Has the Augustinian doctrine of grace anything essentially to add to these words of St. Paul?

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By way of a postscript to a paper which may seem to be threatening perpetuity, may some lines of enquiry be suggested perhaps especially suitable for investigation by the present audience? As is well known, St. Augustine's teaching on grace has, with but slight modifications, dominated the thought of Western Catholicism. How is it that it has had such little influence upon, or apparently excited but indifferent interest among, the Eastern Churches? Will Dr. Lampert's paper show us that the oriental theologians hold an essentially different view of grace, or at least of its relation to man's free will? Certain great names, notably Origen and Chrysostom, are sometimes quoted in an anti-Augustinian sense. Or do they feel that Augustine's inadequate knowledge of Greek led him to misconceive St. Paul's teaching on Justification, and to evolve an unsatisfactory theory with regard to the transmission of Original Sin—an important and highly relevant problem which, as will have been noted, has been sedulously avoided in this paper? On the other hand, may

¹ and ² *De moribus Ecclesiae*, I, 12, 21.

³ *Romans* VI, 20-22.

⁴ *I Corinthians* IV, 7.

it not be that the Greek Fathers are deficient in precisely what St. Augustine supplies? Harnack charges Athanasius, for example, with an "inability to distinguish between nature and grace,"¹ and, as a natural consequence of this, with failing to treat sin "with sufficient gravity."² To some it seems that the Easterns have not an adequate idea of what the Catholic Church means by the "supernatural"; they tend to equate, and therefore confuse, it with the spiritual nature of man.³ Does not their favourite doctrine of "deification" lend itself to a naturalistic, and even pantheistic, interpretation which needs to be corrected by the thought of St. Augustine? He saw with penetrating clearness, and impressed indelibly upon the mind of the Church, the chasm which separates the creature from the Creator, the helplessness of man apart from God. Not that he himself failed to provide difficulties, even for the West. Apart from perhaps the greatest of them, his teaching on Predestination, St. Thomas felt the necessity of emphasising the reality of secondary causes in a way that Augustine had not envisaged. Lastly, but by no means least, is the close inter-relation between sin and the sexual impulse—a characteristic feature of Augustinianism and of vast consequence in the moral teaching of the Western Church—in reality a relic of his former Manichaeism? This was the charge brought against St. Augustine in his own day,⁴ and it is repeated by some of his most appreciative modern interpreters. These questions are more easily asked than answered. The present writer can do no more than propound them; he gladly leaves to others better qualified the task of their solution.

DOM AELRED GRAHAM.

¹ Harnack, *Op. cit.*, Vol. III, 272.

² *Ibid.*, p. 274.

³ Is it possible that the same confusion has entered into the Anglican tradition by way of the Greek Fathers? Mr. C. S. Lewis's recent work *Beyond Personality* has been criticised by a distinguished Catholic theologian as being deficient precisely on this point. "With the clear-cut distinction between the natural and the supernatural (*not* between the natural and the spiritual) firmly grasped—and it can be grasped only by faith and not by experience—the whole of Mr. Lewis's theology would fit perfectly into place, and Catholic doctrine would gain a sincere and able champion."—Canon G. D. Smith, *The Clergy Review* (Vol. XXV, No. 2), February, 1945, p. 69. A suggestive little book by an Anglican writer (*Grace*, Joseph Barker, C.R., Dacre Press), is perhaps open to the same criticism. The essentially supernatural character of grace, as understood by Catholic theologians, is not fully appreciated.

⁴ Harnack, *Op. cit.*, Vol. V, p. 211, note 5.

THE ORTHODOX CHURCH'S TEACHING OF GRACE

FROM the purely theoretical point of view, there are two possible ways of approach to the subject. The first would begin with Orthodox doctrine and lead back to the primary witness of the Christian revelation—the New Testament. The second would start with the New Testament and end with an analysis of the Orthodox doctrine in the light of the biblical teaching. The first of these two methods seems to me to be ruled out for the following reasons. The Orthodox Church does not possess any “symbolical” books in the strict sense of the word. The text-books of dogmatic theology written by Orthodox theologians are like most such text-books—whether Orthodox, Roman-Catholic, Anglican or Protestant—barren and largely useless. Moreover, many of the Orthodox ones reveal in a greater or smaller degree the influence of Roman-Catholicism or Protestantism. True, the Orthodox doctrine of grace can be referred to the ancient Creeds and the decrees of the Ecumenical Councils : but these are not an exclusive possession of the Orthodox Church that one could set up against, or compare with, the views of our heterodox brethren.

In choosing the second method we shall begin with the biblical teaching and show its relation to the essential points of the Orthodox tradition. I need hardly say that the biblical teaching is to be deduced not only from the sayings of our Lord or the apostles, but above all from the very fact of Christ, from His life, death and resurrection, and His pentecostal revelation.

In the early Christian tradition no harmonized theology of grace is to be found. As a matter of fact, in contrast with the later Western developments, the early Christians seem to have had an almost instinctive reluctance towards systematizing the mystery of God's grace. They did not feel the necessity of rationalizing it because, perhaps, they were permanently aware of the direct presence of the grace of God. It was a vital fact of their whole existence ; indeed, that existence itself was a matter of grace. In grace, from the beginning, there acts invariably the unlimited goodness of the Father, the love of Christ that passeth all understanding, and the mysterious power of the Spirit. Everything in

creation, providence and redemption accomplished by the triune God through His love is a manifestation of grace. Ontologically speaking, the whole created universe and all things in it participate in God's grace; and in the Church, the divine-human Body of Christ, they finally attain their saving purpose. The same is true from the ethical point of view, that is to say, from the point of view of the actual participation of those called to fulfil their Christian destiny in the whole historical complex of God's creation.

The basic meaning of the term "grace" which St. Paul, the first to formulate a theology of grace, found in existence was that of God's favour or kindness towards men. But this favour was not conceived merely as an *abstract* quality or state of God's being: it is a quality manifested in operation of a twofold kind. There is first the primordial act whereby God fore-knows men; and there is secondly the temporal act of calling, justifying and sanctifying which, though free and undeserved, is yet contingent upon man's faith. Thus grace is both justification which has to do with the beginnings of Christian life—as it were, its ideal beginnings in God's primordial counsels and its concrete beginning in time—and a divine energy or power, a "power that worketh in us," as St. Paul says, or πνεῦμα, Spirit issuing in the sanctification and deification of man (not, however, because of any external sanction or coercion but implying the self-determination of man by bringing forth the "fruits of the Spirit"). St. Paul seems to set side by side the ideas of human freedom and of divine grace, with no attempt at artificial harmonization. He puts the problem in all its paradoxical character: "Work out *your own* salvation . . . for *it is God* which worketh in you both to will and to do of His good pleasure" (Phil. ii, 12-13), or, as in the Apocalypse, where we find the same double emphasis: "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; if any man hear my voice and *open the door*, I will come in to him, and will sup with him, and he with me" (Apoc. iii, 20). In point of fact these statements of the relation of divine grace and human freedom and responsibility do more justice to the complex facts involved than any attempt at logical harmonization which usually pay the penalty of either pure determinism or pure moralism. Indeed, no aspect of the relation of God and man can be expressed without offending the canons of logical consistency.

It may be said that, on the whole, in St. John it is made particularly clear that grace is preached and considered as the revelation of divine life and light—a power born in the Christian by faith, rather than a mere declaration of God's will. But this is also true of St. Paul, though he is sometimes inclined to regard separately what St. John intuitively considers together.

For the elucidation of the New Testament's unsystematized thoughts regarding race, Spirit and human freedom we must now look to the primitive teachers of Eastern Christendom.

All discussion of God's relation to man in the early Greek Fathers starts with the assumption of man's true and indestructible freedom and responsibility. Grace is not only justification but spiritual and intellectual illumination; and the object of χάρις is not only the individual but the human race as a whole for which God's Spirit, or love, or grace, manifests itself above all in the great acts of revelation—the Incarnation and Christ's triumph over death.

If we enquire how the Eastern Fathers expounded the ideas of sanctification, of God's penetration and transfiguration of the soul, of energy as flowing forth from God to heal the divided nature of human personality, we shall find that the beginnings of sanctification are universally attributed to the Holy Spirit. And the very process and continuation of sanctification in Christ is regularly ascribed to the Holy Spirit. It is one of the main contentions of such Fathers as Basil of Cappadocia and Gregory of Nyssa that the relation between nature and grace is not merely that of vessel and contents: rather the divine power everywhere and always pervades as it sustains life. This idea of the penetrative quality of divine grace, as permeatively sustaining creaturely existence, provided—in modern terminology—a theory that God is immanent as well as transcendent, the immanence no less than the transcendence being based on the actual nature of the divine mode of existence, or "Spirit." And it is significant that, of the three divine persons distinguished in God, the Holy Spirit, to whom the grace was specially appropriated, is the one to whom immanental powers are specifically attributed, as early as in Athenagoras of Athens (2nd century).

But the Eastern Fathers do not lay stress upon, indeed they avoid almost deliberately, any meticulous or very precise conception of the Spirit's action. We find a frequent use

of the word χάρις for instance in the homilies of Macarius of Egypt, as denoting the state of God's being and God's revelation, a power flowing forth from Him and yet identical with Him. But neither the subjective idea of God's "favour" or kindness nor the objective notion of His sanctifying power received any elaborate or technical explication. So far as I am aware not one Eastern Father had been concerned with the classification of grace into what has become to be known in the West as *gratia preveniens* and *cooperans*, or *gratia de congruo* and *de condigno*, or *gratia efficax* and *sufficiens* (though even in the West some have prayed: a *gratia sufficiens libera nos domine*!) There is even no technical equivalent in Patristic literature to the term *gratia infusa*. And even when grace in its character as power (as distinct from mere justification) was emphasized it was never thought of as something in any sense separable from God himself—a thing to be received and made use of, but always as something that belongs to the hypostatic life of God and passing from God to man. It is one of the greatest merits of Gregory Palamas' doctrine of the *uncreated* nature of grace that he has perceived and expressed theologically the *unique* or *single*, as well as the *immediate*, character of grace; in other words that there is only *one* divine grace, not *graces* (*gratiæ*), no matter how naturally grace may assume different forms in Christian experience. The idea of the uncreated character of grace is a powerful weapon against any "objectification" of grace, which belies the very essence of this Christian mystery and falsifies a living relation of God to man into all kinds of things to be parcelled out among men.

Tertullian seems to be the first one in the West to detach, at least partially, the idea of grace from the idea of the hypostatic Spirit of God and to objectify it into an impersonal entity, which is, of course, a complete departure from biblical usage and from the natural meaning of χάρις and πνεῦμα; hence his conception of the Spirit, like that of the human soul, as a highly rarefied and tenuous fluid. This, incidentally, gave rise to the antithesis which has become conventional in certain forms of soteriological thought between "nature" and "grace" as an extraneous force impinging upon the former from without. One may add that this silent yet far-reaching change is expressed in the fact that from now onwards the opposition between *nature* and *grace* tends to push the biblical distinction (cf. also John Chrysostom and the Antiochene

School) between *works* and grace more and more into the background.

It is true that Eastern theological thought and practice have closely associated grace with the sacramental life of the Church, more so than perhaps in the Catholic West, so that the primary channels of divine penetration into human life are seen in the sacraments. The sacramental life, however, is regarded as coming not from the gift of a special sacramental grace, but from the working of the Holy Spirit, and the idea presented is that of a life in communion of the Holy Spirit revealed in the sacraments.

I have said that the discussion of God's relation to man in Eastern Patristic literature starts with the assumption of man's indestructible freedom. This points to an important problem in the theology of grace. The pages of Christian theology are over-full of hoary controversies about the relation of grace to freewill, and I have no intention of joining this controversy or expounding it in any detail. Nevertheless it would be wrong to dismiss the problem, even though it has never occupied the mind of the Eastern Christians to the extent to which this is true of the thought of the West with its long line of "twice-born" thinkers, to use James' familiar term, with its widespread tendency to conceive of grace in regal, governmental and juridical terms and its ensuing systematic development of the idea of grace and the companion concept of original sin.

There is yet another reason why I should like to dwell upon this question: there is, unfortunately, a widespread and quite fallacious tendency to charge Orthodox theology with Pelagianism, semi-Pelagianism or semi-semi-Pelagianism and similar crimes. The latest example of this fallacy is the otherwise very important work of Niebuhr, *The Nature and Destiny of Man* (see Vol. II), where we find an extremely superficial, unfair and even pernicious characterization of the Orthodox theology of grace which the author describes as perfectionist, illusionist, moralistic, and so forth. He talks, as has become already familiar with other authors, of the triumph of Hellenism over Hebraism in the Greek Fathers and Orthodox theology in general, apparently wholly unaware of the fact that the meaning of the philosophical synthesis of the Eastern Fathers is that, though certain motives of Hellen-

istic philosophy were accepted (which in some respects showed a great deal of insight on their part), these motives had been at the same time fundamentally modified so as to render the terminology of ancient thought expressive of a new and thoroughly biblical experience.

There is one important link between Eastern and Western thought with regard to the problem in question in the person of John Cassian. Cassian went through the school of Eastern theology before settling down in the West and had been closely associated with John Chrysostom from whose hands he received the diaconate. He was, consequently, within the sphere of influence of the Antiochene theology which laid stress upon Our Lord's humanity and hence was disposed to insist upon the genuineness of man's freedom. (As such Antiochene theology played a decisive part in the great final synthesis of christological thought.) Cassian is regarded a saint in the East, but in the West, though he exercised a considerable influence, especially in some monastic circles, his divergence from the dominant Augustinianism of the Western Church has apparently invested his memory with suspicion.

Contrary to all Harnacks, Loofs and even Tixeronts Cassian neither was nor intended to be a Pelagian. With a remarkable clarity of perception he pointed to the *christological background* of the whole problem of grace and freedom. It is in fact the implicit assumption of Patristic thought on this matter to view it as a christological question, by-passing, as apparently irrelevant, all the points which resulted in the tendency to conceive of grace in legal or juridical terms. Cassian who was compelled to confront directly the Augustin-versus-Pelagius controversy points out the logical connection between Nestorianism and Pelagianism on the one hand, that is to say, between the christology which regards Christ as an inspired man differing from other men only in respect of the degree of moral union with the Word of God to which he has attained and, consequently, saving his fellowmen only by virtue of the instruction which he gives and the moral example he provides, *and* the anthropology which proclaims that human nature is needing no more than a good example and decent behaviour in order to be able to save itself. On the other hand (though this is not explicitly stated by Cassian), Augustinianism, in as much as it denies human freedom and sets grace over against man, involves a form of Monophysitism in which the manhood is completely crushed, or absorbed

in, or turns out to be a mere mask for, the deity of Jesus Christ.¹

The question of grace and freedom, then, is a christological question, a question of the divine-human mystery of Christ. Christ is God and Man, God-Man, and it is for this reason that in Him human as well as divine freedom are operative. Now Christ's manhood is not a mere individual entity: the whole generation of Adam lives in the Second Adam, the Son of God, and it finds in Him the inner source of its liberty which is not only a freedom like God's and in God, but freedom *in relation* to God. In other words, to receive the freedom of Christ means not only to receive the freedom of God but to receive also that freedom which enables man to turn to God. It is a well-known feature of Patristic christology, more explicitly stated by Irenaeus and the Cappadocians—and perhaps principally by Gregory of Nyssa—to affirm the corporate and universal implications of the Incarnation and hence the participation of the whole of mankind in the work of salvation and the redemption of the world. The whole human race, in a sense, offers in Christ a free response to God. We belong to the same race as Christ, and through Him we have a part in His God-manhood, in the divine mystery which is revealed within the inmost depth of the Holy Trinity. Grace, therefore, which issues from Christ through the Holy Spirit, is not a constraint upon man, and it is not imposed upon him by an extraneous authority. We may say, paradoxically though it may seem, that in grace not only the divine but also the human energy is at work, since the mystery of grace and its inner union with freedom is fundamentally the mystery of the union of the two natures in Christ. Grace proceeds not only from the divine nature of Christ but from His God-manhood, and hence also from the human. This involves a primordial kinship and correlation between God and man, between divine grace and human freedom: that is to say, the very meaning of grace implies the reality of the creature's freedom.

¹ It is interesting to note that the Monophysite tendency, or for that matter the other christological heresies, is in no way confined to certain theological trends, whether in Augustinianism or elsewhere, but has had much more far-reaching repercussions. Thus philosophical Idealism which developed on the spiritual soil of Protestantism (though it has rendered notable service in the struggle for the freedom of the spirit, and has stated and justified the idea of autonomy), is yet also a form of Monophysitism: while recognizing the divine or transcendental freedom, it ignores the freedom of man in his concrete existence.

This position compels us, as it did Cassian, to repudiate any idea of the irresistibility of grace, precisely because of this idea's underlying christological aberration, because it makes of human freedom a mere mode of the self-expression of the divine will, as well as because of the corollary of this idea, the belief, namely, in absolute predestination without regard to man's response. Augustine's treatises, such as *On Rebuke and Grace*, *On the Predestination of the Saints*, or *On the gift of Perseverance*, in which these ideas are developed with remorseless logic, are to the Eastern mind some of the most uncongenial pieces of Western theology.

We affirm the universal necessity of grace as clearly as Augustine himself could have wished, but we conceive this as co-inherent with the power of human freedom. Thus Gregory of Nazianzus began a description of his father's Christian life which expresses the tension as well as the balance of the two factors involved: "I do not know," he says, "which to praise more: the grace which called him or his own choice." And this is nothing more or less than the double emphasis of the original biblical position to which reference was made at the beginning.

Furthermore, the admission of human freedom cannot be confined to what is called *gratia cooperans*: it must be applied to the "first" grace, the grace of conversion. In this sense, it is, strictly speaking, meaningless to talk of prevenient grace, except in the sense of God's absolute priority over His creature, that is to say, in the sense of a *concursum generalis* of God's power which is involved in the fact that in Him we live and move and have our being. The affirmation of the necessity of *pre-venient* grace implies already a dissecting of the divine-human mystery in which all life is bounded, in as much as prevenient grace is (according to what I take to be the accepted meaning in the West) strictly confined—since the Incarnation—to those whom God wills to become members of the Christian Church, and which is sharply to be distinguished from the general assistance which God as Creator and Sustainer bestows everywhere.

I believe that so long as we remain within the framework of the Augustinian system the same inexorable difficulty raises its head, no matter how much we try to elude it, the difficulty, namely, of reprobation, that is to say, of divine predestination to damnation. If prevenient grace is "absolutely necessary for salvation," and if God only wills to

bestow it upon a given number of men, it irresistibly follows that He must be deemed to will the non-salvation of those on whom He does not bestow it. To invoke the inscrutability of God's counsels and the "occult nature" of His justice is obviously no answer at all, especially since throughout the whole argument that precedes the predestinarian conclusion there is usually little sign of the awareness of surrounding mysteries, but, on the contrary, a great deal of rationalizing. Over against this Orthodox theology is able to affirm consistently that God genuinely wills the salvation of all men and not merely of a small body of favourites selected before the foundation of the world for unintelligible and unintelligent reasons. And Cassian observes: "He whose will it is that not one of these little ones should perish—how without monstrous sacrilege shall it be thought that He does not will *all* men to be saved, but merely some in place of all."

I cannot now enter into a discussion of the Orthodox view on predestination (incidentally, the term is all but unknown in Patristic thought). Briefly, it is argued that God's knowledge, being infinite in its capacity and scope, is equal to the task of fore-seeing what is contingent and therefore of fore-seeing who will actually respond to the grace offered them and to attain salvation. Of course, all this raises a maze of tremendous problems, the articulation of which—not to speak of solution—remains inadequate in Orthodox theology.

It has been said that Augustin regards human nature prior to grace as dead, Pelagius as sound, and Cassian as sick. This is well said, except, perhaps, for the clause "prior to grace": the expression seems to be, indeed, meaningless on the christological assumptions which I have tried to elicit. In a certain sense the Orthodox doctrine obliges us to affirm that grace can, so to say, put nothing into man which was not somehow there before, since the bestowal of grace is a relation between the recipient and God which expresses God's purposes for men and men's true nature and destiny. In another sense, however, it is no less true that the relation is realized precisely through grace as the New from above, but also as the way, the truth and the life in which humanity becomes aware of its immediacy to God, and hence could not be realized if it were not present before in germ though not in fulness. "That was the true light which lightest every man that cometh into the world."

There is, then, in the coming of the grace of God both a

catastrophic element: such indeed is the mystery and the cross of Christian particularity; and also the fact of its continuity, since human existence is such as to belie any division of it into something due to nature and something due to grace. Nor can we hold that there are essentially different types of divine favour and influence, as though humanity outside the immediate range of the Church were a vessel propelled by steam while within its borders the new driving power of electricity had suddenly come in. We must not split up God's gifts and dealings with men into classes, saying that some are required by an implied contract between God and His children, while others go beyond the minimum and are something added. All He does and gives is the expression of His love, though that love may be more clearly seen in some things than in others. We may debate the point as to whether this love would, so to say, *a priori* go so far as the sharing of men's stricken pathways in the Incarnation, but once this has been shown it is understood to be the inevitable outcome of His essential nature: He could do no other. This way of looking at the matter really enhances our awareness of grace and gratitude for what He is and what He does. It removes it from the sphere of legal analogies to one where the only bond is that of reciprocal love. I do not think that, as has been suggested, the emergence of legal or juridical notions in Christian theology is necessarily a sign of a greater sense of the personal element in the relation of God and man, since to employ such notions may also mean that Christians are guided in their life and thought by abstractions. It is not by chance that as soon as juridical, normative and legalistic elements penetrate into Christian ethics, they become the ethics of the Scribe and the Pharisee. The ethics of law can indeed become extremely hostile to freedom and personality. We must question all such juristic notions precisely because they *de*-personalize the mysteries of the relation of God and man. I believe that there is more scope for the elucidation of man's personal relation to God on the grounds of Eastern "cosmism" than on those of any form of juridism which is always based on extraneousness and estrangement.

Indeed, the best safeguard against the external, legalistic and hence impersonal point of view is to realize that grace is not something which God gives: rather, it is God himself in the self-revelation of His love encompassing the whole creation

and seeking His other-one in man. Think of it as a "gift" which is, as it were, something other than God, and there is always the pit-fall of self-seeking on the part of man; we stumble against that which is the most subtle obstacle to true Christian life, the temptation to use God for our own purpose, even if the purpose be the salvation of our soul which, however, is frequently nothing more than "heavenly egotism." And it is only in love that we come to know the true, the concrete, unique and personal, quality of the relation of God and man and penetrate into the life of the Kingdom of grace.

E. LAMPERT.

Needless to say a good deal of discussion followed this paper.—EDITOR.

ST. BONAVENTURE ON THE DIVINE SIMPLICITY

THE teaching of the Western Catholic tradition about the Divine Simplicity is of very great importance for the right understanding of Catholic theology and spiritual life. In any discussion about religion the first thing to be done is for each side to discover what the other really means by the word "God"; and those of other traditions can never fully understand what we Western Catholics mean by "God"—and what God means to us—without understanding the teaching of the great Western Doctors about the Divine Unity and Simplicity and also understanding how integral a part of our thought and life that teaching is. The particular presentation of the doctrine which will be discussed in this paper is that of St. Bonaventure. His treatment of the subject, which is based, like all his thought, on St. Augustine, is particularly full and profound. It is also perhaps likely to be attractive to those of some other traditions, as it is throughout Platonic and Plotinian in character and expression. St. Bonaventure was consciously and deliberately opposed to the new Aristotelianism of his time and the fairly large Aristotelian element which is apparent in his language, thought and method is only that which is common to the whole Christian Neo-Platonist tradition. It must however be realized that, though

they differ in emphasis and expression, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas are in this matter of the Divine Simplicity in the most complete agreement. Both are developing the teaching of St. Augustine, and the conclusions they reach are in all essentials the same.

That God is absolutely One is of course the common teaching of scripture and of all Christian tradition; but the distinctive form which the doctrine of the absolute Unity and Simplicity of the Divine Being has taken in Western theology was given to it by St. Augustine, who at this point in his thought is very deeply influenced by Plotinus. The effects of this influence of Plotinus persist throughout the later development of the doctrine. The occurrence of the names of Plotinus and St. Augustine at the beginning of the tradition should be sufficient to show that the Western doctrine of the Divine Simplicity is not simply the result of a rigid logical deduction from an abstract concept of being, as has sometimes been said. It is the very gravest injustice to St. Thomas to misrepresent his thought about God as being mere abstract logic-spinning divorced from the realities of the spiritual life. Even Aristotle's theology is not only that, and St. Thomas is a great Christian and Augustinian thinker before he is an Aristotelian. But no one who has read and understood anything of Plotinus or St. Augustine or St. Bonaventure would ever dream of misrepresenting their immensely vital and profoundly and obviously contemplative thought in this way. It is therefore worth stressing again that St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure are in agreement in all essentials about the Divine Simplicity and that they base their teaching solidly on St. Augustine, through whom the influence of Plotinus comes into the tradition. In all the great Western Doctors, what we are dealing with is not deduction from an abstract concept but the confessedly and necessarily stammering and inadequate attempt to express the obscure but overwhelmingly powerful consciousness of the presence of a Reality transcending speech or thought.

This conviction that in approaching the doctrine of the Divine Unity or Simplicity we are entering a region of the highest mystery is one of the first and most important things we can gain from a study of the Western Doctors. Whether we approach from the side of the Divine Unity or Being or Eternity or Thought or Power, we always come to a point where thought stops, where our minds can go no further;

and God lies on the other side of it. St. Bonaventure insists on this particularly. To him as to the others only God can, strictly speaking, understand God, but even such understanding of the mystery of the Divine Simplicity as man can attain is only possible, he says, to contemplatives raised beyond themselves in the high vision of ecstasy.¹ We shall do well to remember this, and to approach the doctrine with the utmost diffidence and humility, as being all of us far below that height of the spiritual life at which there begins to be any hope of even an imperfect human understanding of the mystery. But though our Doctors insist on the inadequacy of reason to attain this object, yet they also both by precept and example make it clear that we must use it to take us as far as it will go; reason, certainly, enlightened by faith and supported by continual prayer, but still reason, and of the finest possible quality, for only the finest possible instruments are fit to be used in God's service. The inscrutability of the One Godhead is no excuse for us to lapse into low-grade fantasy-thinking. We must in speaking of divine things make frequent use of pictorial metaphors drawn from the material world, as all the great Fathers and Doctors have done, not least St. Bonaventure. But we must use them as the greatest of the Fathers and Doctors do, purifying them continually by the judgment of reason and never resting content with an uncritical, literal and materialistic acceptance. In this we shall find St. Augustine and St. Bonaventure excellent guides. And above all, we must never emancipate ourselves from the bounds of rationality altogether and make meaningless because directly contradictory statements about God. If we are going to talk nonsense about His Divine Majesty, we had much better keep silence, an alternative to speech which, after all, is always possible and often desirable. Reason, if rightly used in humility and with Divine illumination can show us where the Mystery lies and what roads point towards it, though without ever reaching it.

The mystery of the Divine Simplicity may equally well be called, in the teaching of St. Augustine and his successors, the mystery of the Divine Plenitude. That is, in defending the absolute Simplicity of the Godhead they are insisting on its infinite Fulness. The two are only two ways of looking at the same thing. Partition, division or real distinction in the Divine Essence which meant that one part or power

¹ *Hexaemeron* XII.

was not another part or power or was not the Substance, would mean negation, limitation, the introduction of an element of potentiality or not-being into God, a bounding of the Divine Life, shadows in the Divine Light. If God had parts he could not be infinite, that is he would not be God, the actually infinite plenitude of Being differing absolutely by that infinite fulness from the multitude of limited, relative created beings. As Plotinus said: "He suffices for himself and the others, being what He is";¹ and He is infinitely sufficient because absolutely simple. This aspect of the doctrine is particularly emphasised in St. Bonaventure because he loves to dwell on the Divine Life and the Divine Fecundity. The Blessed Trinity is for him the perfect, infinite, self-contained expression of the Divine Fecundity, the complete self-diffusion of God's goodness.² He speaks of the Divine Plenitude and the Divine Simplicity³ in a way which shows clearly that the two ideas in his mind are only aspects of one truth.

One way which St. Augustine, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas take to clear our minds of all idea of limitation and multiplicity when we are trying to think about the Divine Essence should be carefully noted. This is their insistence on the unpredicability of God, the way in which they make clear that He is outside all logical categories, including that of substance.⁴ St. Augustine prefers to call God Essence rather than Substance because "substantia" means to him a subject to which predicates can be applied; and he is inclined to hold that only God should be called "essentia" to mark his absolute difference from the substances we know.⁵ St. Bonaventure agrees in making God transcend the categories.⁶ He applies this by saying that Divine Truth and the Idea in God is not like other likenesses or ideas "secundum proprietatem generis" but "simpliciter extra genus," and that God as cause and God's knowledge are neither universal nor particular, but resemble both in different ways.⁷

From the statement that God is not in the genus or category of substance we may naturally go on to consider St. Bonaventure's teaching about the various names, Just, Wise, Strong, etc., which we give to God. It is customary to talk

¹ *Enneads* VI, 7, 37.

² *Itinerarium* VI.

³ *Hexameron* XII. *Itinerarium* V.

⁴ St. Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, 1, 2. St. Thomas, *Contra Gentes* I, 25, etc.

⁵ *De Trinitate* VII, 5, 10, cp. V, 2, 3.

⁶ *I Sent.* VIII, p. II. Art. I, Q. 4, ad 4 and concl.

⁷ *I Sent.* XXXV, Art. I, Q. 2, ad concl.

rather misleadingly about the Divine Attributes ; of course, if God is not a substance in the sense of a subject, attributes cannot be predicated of Him. Yet it is essential to use many names of Him, and to hold that, though they all refer to One Thing, they are not empty sounds or mere synonyms. If we try to confine ourselves to one name or to pure negations we shall fall into the error of limiting the Infinite Simplicity by thinking of it as a bare negation like primal matter or an abstraction. St. Augustine established the principle which later Western thinkers followed that all perfections are one perfection in God, Who is His Being infinite in plenitude ; it is the same thing for Him to be Just or Strong or Wise as to be,¹ and all the names we give Him refer to the same thing, the infinite perfection of His Being. St. Bonaventure explains that we have to use many names because we know a multitude of different perfections from creatures which God's single perfection comprehends and transcends. We can only approach the Divine Perfection by numbers of converging routes from different points in the created universe.² It is an application of the very important principle found in both Philo and Plotinus that we can only know the Absolute Divine Unity in a multiple image. St. Bonaventure insists³ that our names for God are not all merely metaphors. Many of them refer to real perfections, known to us from creatures and comprehended in the infinite perfection of God.

The most difficult of all questions raised by the doctrine of the Divine Simplicity is that of the multiplicity of the Ideas, the eternal Forms or Archetypes in the Divine Mind whose existence St. Augustine, St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure all alike most vigorously maintain. It is the full answer to the question how the many Forms are many and yet one in God which St. Bonaventure says, in *Hexaemeron* XII, can only be perceived by special divine illumination by a contemplative in ecstasy. It is however a question of the very highest importance for him. The Ideas are the very centre of his philosophy, as Christ the Eternal Likeness, the Eternal Art, the Divine Wisdom in Whom the Father has perfectly expressed His Ideas, is of his theology and prayer. To deny the Ideas is for St. Bonaventure to deny Christ, to deny the Divine Wisdom and Divine Predestination. The Ideas are also the foundation of his doctrine of the material world as

¹ *De Trinitate* VI, 4, 6.

² *I Sent.* XXII, Art. I, Q. 2, ad concl.

31. c.

shadow, trace, and way to God and the human soul as His Image on which so much of his guidance for the spiritual life is based. He therefore does his best to answer the question "aliqua¹liter," to give some sort of explanation as far as the ordinary human intellect illumined by revelation and grace will take him.

We may take as our starting point in considering St. Bonaventure's explanation a passage in the "Commentary on the Sentences" which sums it up very well: "The idea of a man and the idea of a donkey are the same thing in the Divine Substance: when, however, the Divine Substance makes a donkey It does not make it according to the idea of a man but according to the idea of a donkey . . . now there is multitude in the ideas with regard to what they connote"¹ (i.e., the "ideata," or things created or creatable in the likeness of the Ideas). What St. Bonaventure means is that all the Ideas are One Thing, the single and simple Divine Essence known by God in a single and simple eternal regard which is the Divine Essence Itself. All that is in God is simply Divine Essence. But the Divine Essence is imitable by created things in an infinite number of different ways and is known by God as so imitable. Thus we may say that there are in the single Divine Essence an infinite multitude of "similitudines expressivae," "creative likenesses," likenesses which are or could be the causes of the existence of an infinite number of particular created things; and this is just exactly what the Ideas are. They are thus many Ideas or likenesses but One Thing, the Divine Essence infinitely imitable or communicable. Their multiplicity is a relative multiplicity, with respect to the "ideata," the things actual or possible, which are or could be created in the likeness of the Ideas; and as there is no real relation between God and creatures and God is not affected by creatures, according to the common teaching of all Catholic theologians, this relative multiplicity does not involve any real distinction, with the accompanying limitation and imperfection, in the Divine Essence. God knows the Ideas distinctly and directly. He knows them, that is, not by deducing the knowledge of them as effects from His knowledge of Himself as Cause, but "simplici aspectu," in that single and complete and comprehensive regard with which He knows His own Infinite Essence, a regard which as we have seen is absolutely unbounded and neither general

¹ III *Sent.*, Art. I, Q. I, ad concl.

nor particular. St. Bonaventure is perfectly prepared to call the Divine Art or Wisdom "one and many" as long as the "many" is taken in the relative sense explained above, and not as introducing any real distinction into God. St. Bonaventure is very much concerned to show how absolutely different the Divine Knowledge is from any knowledge of which we can have any experience in ourselves. He stresses the fact that the Divine Idea is not a "*similitudo expressa*," a likeness impressed on the mind by the thing which it is like, but a "*similitudo expressiva*," a likeness which causes the existence of that which is like it; and "*similitudines expressivae*" are something of which we can have no direct cognition or experience.¹ And we can see throughout his discussion how at every step he takes into account the Divine Infinity and Eternity, which remove the Divine Thought utterly beyond our power to realise. We cannot conceive what a thought with no time-element at all which is its actually infinite object is really like.

The Ideas of course are actually infinite in number and there are Ideas of individuals, because it is in the Ideas that God knows all things. And because they are infinite and are all One Thing, the Divine Essence, than which nothing can be nobler, there is no order or hierarchy of nobility among the Ideas. Neither is there confusion, but absolute simultaneity, as there must be the Infinite and Eternal.²

The point at which the doctrine of the Divine Simplicity touches our spiritual life most closely is in its application to the considering of God's Power and His working in us. Here St. Bonaventure has nothing to say very different from the common teaching of the West, but his preoccupation with the Divine Plenitude and Fecundity enables him to say it very well. "The necessity of God being in all things," he says,³ "comes partly from His own perfection, partly from the need of things. . . . Because He is supremely Simple, He is restricted to nothing; therefore He is found in all things as unbounded. Because He is supremely Simple therefore, He is infinitely full of power; therefore His power is in all things: and His power is the same thing as His substance: and therefore it is necessary that He should be in all things. On the side of the creature it is necessary

¹ *I Sent.* XXXV, I, 1.

² *I Sent.* XXXV, Art. I, Q. 6, ad concl.

³ *I Sent.* XXXVII, Pt. I, Art. I, Q. 1, ad concl.

that He should be present because the creature has in itself possibility and emptiness . . . because it is produced from nothing . . . therefore it lacks stability and cannot be except through the presence of Him who gave it being." Or again,¹ "Because He is supremely One and of all kinds, therefore, He is all things in all; although 'all things' are many and He is only One; this is because by His most simple Unity, most clear Truth and most pure Goodness there is in Him all powerfulness, all exemplary likeness, and all communicability." God in His unboundedness is outside all the limited, ordered hierarchy of created beings and therefore He is immediately present everywhere and in everything, and present as a whole in everything because He is bounded by nothing and wholly other than everything. He is wholly present everywhere and in everything, but He gives more to some things than others according to their need, and therefore we can distinguish different degrees of His presence, by nature, grace and union, according to the difference of the effects He produces by His presence. This conviction that the Divine Essence works directly in us, that God's Power in us is simply Himself, that we 'participate in the Ineffable ineffably' (Damascius), but directly and not through any power or intermediary, created or uncreated, other than and inferior to the One Substance of God Himself, is at the very root of Western contemplative prayer. A passage from St. Bonaventure's *Hexaemeron*² will perhaps indicate something of what it may mean. "This is the inaccessible light which is yet most near to the soul, even nearer than she is to herself. This cannot be bound down, and is yet most deep within us. But only a man borne up beyond himself in the high vision can see this truth."

Finally let us look at one passage³ which will, I think, show better than many words of commentary how integrated St. Bonaventure's thought about the Divine Simplicity and Plenitude is with his theology of the Trinity; in this of course he represents the Augustinian tradition and differs from St. Thomas. He writes: "And that which is one in many not multiplied is understood to be still more simple; and in this way our faith understands God. . . . The man who understands God as multiplied in essence or one in substrate takes away from His supreme simplicity and also from His

¹ *Itinerarium* V.

² *Hexaemeron* XII.

³ *I Sent.* VIII, Pt. II, Art. I, Q. 1, ad concl.

nobility. For when supreme simplicity is understood, supreme actuality ought to be understood, if it is supremely noble. And where there is supreme actuality, we ought to assume a supreme degree of diffusion and communication. And this cannot be except in the eternal production of a thing altogether infinite and equal in power. And this cannot be in otherness of essence. Therefore the Most Simple Divine Essence cannot be understood, unless It is understood to be all in Three Persons, of Whom one is from another."

Supreme simplicity means supreme actuality. Supreme actuality means supreme fecundity. And in supreme fecundity, contemplated in faith, we can discern the Trinity. In some such way as this we may sum up the essentials of the profound and noble presentation, rich in the sense of mystery, of the Western tradition about the Divine Simplicity by one of the greatest of Western contemplative theologians, St. Bonaventure. May his prayers help us in our study.

A. H. ARMSTRONG.

THE THEOLOGICAL TEACHING OF GREGORY PALAMAS ON DIVINE SIMPLICITY

ITS EXPERIMENTAL ORIGIN AND PRACTICAL ISSUE

I

THE matter I have to discuss before you is something much more than just one particular point of theology, spiritual, dogmatic or historical. Opponents of "Palamism," more often than not Catholics, and on the other hand its adherents, more often than not Orthodox, are at one in acknowledging its great value for the understanding of Orthodoxy. While giving it as his opinion, "that nothing is more contrary not only to Christian theology, but also, and above all, to sound philosophy," Père Jugie admits that Palamism has managed to acquire force of dogma in the Orthodox Church since the separation from Rome.¹ But at the same time he does try to find certain contradictions in this regard in the history of the theological teaching of the various Orthodox Churches and does minimize its real influence.

¹ *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, art. *Palamas*, t. XI, c. 1817.

The Orthodox, of course, are much more emphatic still, especially as regards the practical aspect. For example, the monk Basil Krivoshein in his remarkable study published in an English translation in the *Eastern Churches Quarterly* for 1938 under the title, "The Ascetic and Theological Teaching of Gregory Palamas," makes the following statement: "To sum up in short the significance of Gregory Palamas in the development of Orthodox thought, we may say that the traditional ascetico-mystical teaching of the Orthodox East not only finds in his works its final and systematic expression but also its theological and philosophical expression."¹

Similar to this is the opinion of Orthodox theologians belonging to other national Churches, e.g., Th. Kastanas, and of course G. Papamichail, whose study, although of first-rate importance, is now beginning to date a little, Fr. D. Staniloae, professor at Sibiu before this war, and others.²

Finally, during the last few months has appeared an article by V. Lossky, "La théologie de la lumière chez Saint Grégoire de Thessalonique,"³ to which I am greatly indebted and which contains all the recent bibliography on the subject. His conclusion is as follows: "It seems obvious to us that apart from this theology of Light which we have just described in its broad outlines, the whole spiritual wealth of the Christian East would seem, in the eyes of a foreign onlooker, lifeless, lacking in that inner warmth which is the very thing which constitutes the deep peculiarity of Orthodox devotion."⁴ Other testimonies will be quoted in our summing up.

The fundamental importance of our subject and its superlative value in the work of Reunion are, I take it, obvious. In the past it has stirred up violent controversies between Catholics and Orthodox and even to-day rumblings can still be heard; but it would scarcely seem necessary to state that I shall endeavour to give it an eirenic treatment.

As the title I have chosen indicates clearly enough, I shall not deal with the *whole* of Palamism, but merely with its central point, and even in so doing I shall consider this solely from

¹ p. 207.

² Γ. Παπαμιχαήλ: 'Ο ἅγιος Γρηγόριος Παλαμᾶς, Alexandria, 1911; Theodore N. Kastanas: 'Ο ἅγιος Γρηγόριος ὁ Παλαμᾶς καὶ ὁ Μυστικισμὸς τῶν Ἑσυχαστῶν, Salonica, 1939; Prot. Dr. D. Staniloae *Viata și învățătura sfântului Grigorii Palama*, Sibiu, 1938.

³ In *Dieu vivant*, Perspectives religieuses et philosophiques, no. 1, 1945, pp. 95-118.

⁴ *Id.*, p. 118.

the dogmatic point of view. I shall then take for granted a knowledge, at any rate in broad outline, of the biography and the surroundings of the great fourteenth century Byzantine Archbishop of Thessalonica, and completely ignore all the rather involved literary problems.

I must make another disclaimer. I am no specialist on Palamas, but I thought I could reply to Dom Bede Winslow's invitation just the same, for, before one can come to any decision on the problem of Palamism—and we shall try to show in our summing up how a Catholic interested in Reunion ought to tackle the question—is it not worth while and even indispensable, when one wants to be eirenic, i.e. simply fair, to understand the way in which competent Orthodox scholars envisage the question? "There is, of course, no need," writes Mr. Lossky, "to prove the necessity for a deep study of the theological tradition of the East; that necessity is obvious to all. But if we wish this study to serve the cause of a *rapprochement* and of mutual understanding (and is not that precisely what all of us here want?), we must make up our minds to look at and judge this tradition otherwise than through the medium of the rigid concepts of an academic system of theology completely foreign to it. Then the doctrinal aspects which showed as points of disagreement in the past, will perhaps become fertile sources for a spiritual renewal in the future."¹ In addition to which, the Orthodox point of view which I wish to lay before you, as far as I myself have been able to understand it, is often inaccessible to Western students. I hope the Orthodox present at these meetings will understand me in this and excuse my presumption, but having been asked to discuss the matter, I could not treat it otherwise than like this. In view of this, I shall take the liberty, when the contrast is too blatant between the Orthodox point of view and the Catholic one which has hitherto held the field and to which Mr. Lossky refers in the sentence just quoted, of mentioning this contrast. So much for the preliminaries, let us now get down to business.

* * * * *

I have just stated that my exposition will be dogmatic, but dogmatic in a rather unusual fashion, a fashion moreover which Mr. Lossky considers peculiarly Orthodox. "Every dogmatic work," he writes, "has at its root a mystical experience." This is especially true in the case of Gregory Palamas,

¹ Id., p. 118.

for all who know him, be they Catholic or Orthodox, are once more in agreement in their opinion that all his theology tends towards one end, the explanation and justification of a mystical experience. Certain aspects of this will crop up inevitably in our exposition, but it would go beyond the confines of our subject to examine it in detail. Suffice it to say that for the Orthodox the mystical experience of the hesychasts of Mount Athos, i.e., of the strictly contemplative monks, systematized by Palamas, is in direct descent from the monks of Egypt, especially St. Macarius (or the Pseudo-Macarius?). The Catholic authors who have made a speciality of the question on the other hand (M. Jugie and S. Guichardan), consider it a deviation due to the Messalian influence of the Bogomils of Macedonia. That should be enough on that point for the moment.

Whatever its orthodoxy or unorthodoxy, whatever its traditional or untraditional character, the mystical experience which Palamas sets out to justify is the "deification" of man, his sharing in the divine nature, as St. Peter teaches in his second Epistle, i, 4 (ἵνα διὰ τούτων γένησθε θείας κοινωνοὶ φύσεως), a text which keeps on cropping up all through the Palamite controversy.

Palamas is struck, on the one hand, by the deep-lying duality between the Creator and the creature, whether spiritual or corporeal. I quote Lossky, as this point seems fundamental for the comprehension of the thought we are studying. "A dualist philosophy which for three hundred years and perhaps more makes a radical separation between matter and spirit, body and soul, sense and intellect, is doubtless responsible for the attitude which instinctively makes us place God on the spiritual side and oppose Him thus to the corporeal world. . . . (This) often leads us to forget that for Christian theology there is another supremely significant separation, viz., the separation which opposes Uncreated Being, God, and Created Being, the world created from nothing together with all the spiritual and corporeal entities which go to make up its entirety. Is God merely the God of spirits, or is He not rather the God of all flesh also? For the Cartesian concept of God the Mathematician, the answer is obvious: He is a God of spirits, a God of intelligences; but for God the Trinity dwelling in inaccessible Light and penetrating by means of His energies the created world, the world of pure spirits as well as the world of corporeal beings, it is not the same: He is at the same time

removed from and as close to intelligences as He is to senses.”¹ This last phrase forestalls certain notions which we shall examine in detail later on. Let us note for the moment that Palamas is deeply imbued with the sense of the divine transcendence, and in support of this he is fond of quoting texts of Scripture, e.g., “God dwelleth in Light inaccessible” (I Tim., vi, 16), or again, “No man saw God at any time” (Jn., i, 18), etc. According to Palamas, say his Orthodox exponents, there is an essential and transcendental unintelligibility in God, an essential darkness which is the basis of a negative or *apophatic* theology of a radical and altogether special kind, not in any way resulting from the weakness of our intelligence, and inherited by Palamas directly from the writings of the Areopagite and of St. Maximus the Confessor. We shall come back to this in a moment. Let us however note before going any further that a transcendently apophatic theology of this kind can make nothing of a refined conceptualism, inasmuch as sensible images will on occasion more nearly than the abstractions which to the normal human reason seem most worthy of God, translate the divine reality, unknowable and yet at the same time in a certain sense knowable—we shall see in what sense in a moment. In this Palamas endeavours to follow Holy Scripture, the anthropomorphic expressions of which do not cause him the slightest embarrassment and which, therefore, have not, according to him, the slightest need of any metaphysical purification.

On the other hand, to take up again Palamas’s fundamental intuition, the first alternative of which we have just discussed, he acknowledges with no less conviction an immanence of God in His creation whether spiritual or corporeal, amounting even to a real as opposed to a metaphorical deification. In this case God can be known by the attribution of the perfections found in the creative world: goodness, wisdom, life, love, being, etc. This is St. Paul’s *γνωστόν τοῦ θεοῦ*, and is likewise what constitutes *cataphatic* theology.

The opposition between these two theologies cannot, according to Palamas, be reduced by a conciliation. The tradition to which he belongs here seems to Lossky in opposition with Western theological traditions which are none the less themselves also inheritors of the thought of the Areopagite.² I quote: “For St. Thomas Aquinas, for example, the contradiction between the two theological ways simply

¹ Id., p. 112.

² *Dieu vivant*, p. 102.

does not exist ; the negative and positive ways can and must be brought into agreement with one another, or rather reduced to one single way, that of positive theology ; in this case, the negative way would be nothing more than a complement, a correction of the positive way, indicating merely that all the affirmations made regarding the nature of God must be understood in a more sublime manner (*modo sublimiori*). For Nicholas Cusanus, the great mystical dialectician, more deeply impregnated with the Dionysian tradition (as is the case with the whole of the German school of mysticism), the opposition between the two theological ways retains its full force ; these two ways remain irreconcilable for the mind of man, but their opposition is resolved in God who is the *coincidentia oppositorum*.”¹ In the theology of Palamas, this opposition is even more marked than in that of Nicholas, because his teaching aims at being infinitely respectful of God. “It is characteristic of any theology which aims at preserving due reverence to affirm at one time one thing, at another time another, when both affirmations are true.”²

It is essential to keep the balance between the two opposing members in order not to lose contact with the revealed truths, by substituting for them the concepts of a man-made philosophy.” The object of such a theology of oppositions is not, as Lossky writes,³ to hammer out a system of concepts, but to serve as a support to the human mind in the contemplation of the divine mysteries, to explain a mystical experience, Palamas’s very object, as we have seen. In this order of theological thought, “each opposition established between two propositions, true in themselves produces a dogma, i.e., a distinction which, while real, is incapable either of comprehension or of expression, incapable of being founded on concepts or of being deduced by a process of reasoning, inasmuch as it is the expression of a reality of a religious kind. If we must establish these distinctions, it is precisely in order to safeguard the opposition, to prevent the human mind from going astray by breaking the opposition and then falling from the contemplation of the divine mysteries into the platitude of some kind of rationalism, replacing a vital experience by concepts. The opposition, on the other hand, lifts the

¹ Id., p. 103.

² *Capita physica, theologica, moralia et practica* 150, cap. 121, P.G. 150, c. 1205.

³ *Art. cit.*, p. 101.

mind from the realm of concepts up to the concrete facts of Revelation.”¹ We might add with Father Basil Krivoshein that a knowledge of this kind is more properly a communion. I have made this long quotation from Mr. Lossky because I doubt whether one can better characterize Palamas’s mental attitude, an attitude which it is essential to understand before we tackle our subject.

Palamas, then, is struck by the opposition between the transcendence and the immanence of God, between His incognoscibility and His cognoscibility. He finds this opposition in Holy Scripture, as we have seen, but also in the Fathers, above all Dionysius the Areopagite, St. Maximus and St. John Damascene.²

To explain this opposition, Palamas has recourse, as is only natural in his theological manner, to a mysterious distinction in the very nature of God, the distinction between the divine essence and the divine operations or energies. We shall now try to examine this more closely.

II

The essence of God is utterly beyond the approach of any creature and utterly beyond the power of any created wisdom to name, to such an extent that the very name “essence” is inadequate,—it would be better to say “super-essence”—as is also the name “divinity.” This essence is the divine darkness. Revelation teaches us that in this super-essence occur certain mysterious processions which produce therein a real distinction between it and the divine hypostases, a distinction, however, which does not impair its simplicity; in a word, this super-essence is the Trinity. It is cause and principle, invisible, incomprehensible, immovable, indivisible, unsharable, immortal in itself, inimitable, and without any relation with the world.

But alongside this essence or higher divinity there is—and Palamas is no less emphatic on this point—an act of will common to the three hypostases, beyond all time and understanding, by means of which this super-essence reveals itself, a procession (πρόοδος) a leap outwards (ἔξαλμα). These are the energies of God; they are likewise processions within

¹ Id., pp. 101–102.

² The texts are quoted in, for example, the articles of Père Jugie on Palamas and the Palamite Controversy in the *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique*.

the essence, but in contradistinction to the processions of the Trinity, they are not hypostatic and, though eternal, are turned towards creation. We shall return to this last point in a moment.

To quote Lossky : “ The energies are not effects extraneous to the divine essence, they are not acts outside God, due to His will, such as the creation of the world or acts of providence. They are *natural* processions in God Himself, a mode of existence proper to Him and according to which God exists not only in His essence but also outside His essence. . . It would be wrong to imagine that the divine energies exist only in so far as there is a relation of God to what is external to Him, i.e., only with a view to the creation of the world. . . If the world had not been created, God would exist just the same, not only in His unapproachable essence but also outside His essence in the energies which are the overflow of His essence.” The divine energies are an inferior divinity, which does not in the least mean that God is lessened in them ; they are inferior to the essence as the Son is inferior to the Father. It is to these energies that the name Divinity (θεότης) can and must be applied. They are not an accident, because they are eternal and unchangeable, but inasmuch as they do not exist of themselves, *a se*, they are called by Palamas quasi-accidents (συμβεβηκός πως).

While not depending on creation, as has been explained, the energies are turned towards it, and this enables an excellent Orthodox authority on Palamism, the Archimandrite Cyprian Kern, to say, not quite accurately it is true, “ Energy is that which in the absolute and incommunicable divinity is turned towards the world.”¹ The notion of these energies is complex and many-sided. If, in relation to the triune super-essence, the energies are one, in relation to the creature they are many but still common to the three hypostases. First of all, they are the world of ideas, and in this connection the same Father Kern makes an important clarification : “ We cannot say that the energies are the sphere of ideas on the world ; it would be more exact to say that the world of ideas is in its entirety contained in the divine energy.” Next, energy is the passing of these ideas from power to act—creation : yet another form is providential care for the creature ; next, it is the attributes of God known by the creature : His goodness, wisdom, beauty, etc. ; those attributes of which St. Paul speaks in his

¹ In an article to be published in *Irénikon* soon.

Epistle to the Romans and which we have already met. For Palamas they are not in any way at all abstract concepts applicable to the divine essence, but living, personal forces ; not at all in the sense of individual beings as was perversely insisted by his opponents eager to accuse him of polytheism, but definitely in the sense of manifestations of a personal God. These attributes are concrete terms taken from Holy Scripture, the anthropomorphic expressions of which do not cause Palamas the slightest embarrassment, as we have already remarked. This energy is again, to remain in keeping with Scriptural language, the seven spirits mentioned in Isaiah (Chapter xi, 2), or the various manifestations of God in the Old Testament, e.g., the cloud and the Shekinah. And last but certainly not least, to demonstrate its essentially concrete character—and the Palamite controversy began and continued to rage round this essential point—this energy is the Light of which the Bible speaks so often—Palamas is fond of quoting it—and on which we shall dilate with more profit later on.

These energies, however,—and this is a capital fact in Palamas's system which we shall understand better in a moment—these energies spread about in the world though they be, remain divine and increate, seeing that they are one with the energy that is in God, and that energy is always similar to what produces it. Palamas moreover takes a delight in pointing out the absurdities which would follow from a created state of this energy. Time will not allow us to follow him.

By opposing them to essence, we may say to conclude, that the energies are sharable, indivisibly divisible, capable up to a certain point of being thought and named.

* * * * *

What has been said of the differences between essence and energies has already given an inkling of the nature of the distinction between them, and this is the point of paramount importance in the Palamite system, but we must still make one or two clarifications in so far as they are possible in this matter. Palamas is very definite that everything he says must be understood worthily of God, θεοπρεπῶς, and inexpressibly, ἀπορρήτως. That being so, it seems rather futile to try and fit his statements into the accepted distinctions of scholastic philosophy as Père Guichardan endeavours to do in his book, *Le Problème de la simplicité divine en Orient et en*

Occident au XIV et XV s. : Grégoire Palamas, Duns Scot, Georges Scholarios (p. 105 suiv.).

Here are a few details. Palamas insists that the distinction between essence and energies is a real one, objectively founded in God and no mere product of our weak reason; it is a *πραγματική διάκρισις*, not a *διάκρισις κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*, but he is at least equally insistent that it is not a real separation, *πραγματική διαίρεσις*.

The distinction is founded on a principial, causal relationship (*τὸ αἴτιον καὶ τὸ αἰτιατόν*) analogous to that which exists in the divine essence between the hypostasis of the Father and the hypostases of the Son and the Holy Ghost. But this causal relationship, of course, cannot be understood as we understand it in the case of created things, or even assimilated to any distinction between created objects. That has been in the past and appears still to be the mistake of Catholic experts on the question, as, for example Père Jugie and Père Guichardan our contemporaries, who reproach Palamas with dividing God into two parts to make of Him two Gods. It is true that Palamas himself is fond of using images to make clear the distinction, and of those very same images which the Greek Fathers used in their attempt to penetrate, were it but a little, into the divine hypostatical processions. The most frequently recurring comparison is that of the orb of the sun and its ray.

To deny the distinction between essence and energies would thus be equivalent, on the one hand, to a kind of Sabellianism and, on the other hand, would lead to utter absurdities. The Archimandrite Cyprian sums them up as follows: "If the divine energy is not in any way distinguished from the divine essence, then the creation which is proper to the energy will be in no way distinguished from the begetting of the Son and the procession of the Holy Ghost which are proper to the essence; and if these latter are in no way distinguished from the former, then the creature will be no longer distinguished from the Son and the Holy Ghost. If the divine energies are many—and the holy Fathers teach us they are—and if they are identical with the essence, the essence will also be many," etc. I spare you any further *reductiones ad absurdum*: in any case, we shall meet one or two later on.

The most important property of the distinction, however, is that it does not destroy the divine simplicity, it does not introduce any composition therein. This fact is so fundamental for Palamism and was so fiercely attacked by the anti-

Palamites that the Council of Constantinople in 1352 anathematized anyone who maintained the contrary. The chief argument of the Palamites, as one might guess, is the assimilation of this case to that of the simplicity of the essence which is not destroyed either, by its real distinction from the hypostases, a distinction, be it noted in passing, which is denied by Catholic theology. Speculatively we can say that God remains simple in spite of the multiplicity of His energies really distinct from one another, because, inasmuch as they are not accidents which can increase or decrease, they are inseparable from the essence and are always in act; they are eternal and immutable, and do not therefore introduce any kind of composition in God. Scholastics like Père Jugie and Père Guichardan grant in such an hypothesis the absence of physical composition, but they do not see how one can escape a metaphysical composition, a thing one cannot admit in God.

To this the Orthodox reply by taking refuge in apophatics: the simplicity of God is something which transcends our categories. Mr. Lossky writes, "Taking the incognoscibility of God as a starting point, one would rather be inclined to say that God cannot be said to be simple essence, without by so-doing abating something from His character of absolute incognoscibility."¹

This is how Père Jugie sums up, to my mind well, the teaching of Palamas on the divine essence and energies: "God is like a spiritual, uncreated, everlasting sun, in which there are three things really distinct and different, and yet inseparably united and really undivided, viz., firstly, a central nucleus absolutely invisible, inaccessible, incommunicable and indivisible—this is the divine essence considered in itself; secondly, in this central nucleus, three points really distinct from one another and from the centre itself—these are the three divine hypostases or persons; thirdly, a multitude of rays really distinct from one another, arising *ab aeterno* from the centre and the three points as from their source and their common principle, to reach, each one in its own way and according to its distinctive nature, without any alteration, the creatures which appear in time."² The divine energy reaches pre-eminently man and deifies him.

¹ Art. cit., p. 101.

² *Dict. Théol. Cath.*, c. 1755.

III

How does this deification of man, this participation in the divine nature which haunts Palamas, operate? The exposition already made enables us to reply. It is not a sharing in the unsharable divine essence. The contrary proposition would, of course, lead to heresy: if man could be at any moment united to the very essence of God, he would be God by nature; this would, on the one hand, be tantamount to pantheism which obliterates the division between God and the creature, on the other, there would no longer be a trinity of hypostases in the essence, but a multiplicity of hypostases equal in number to the number of men sharing in it. In the realm of religious knowledge, man's intellectual communion with the essence of God would be equivalent to Eunomianism, i.e., a rationalism admitting the perfect intelligibility of God, and at the same time equivalent to Messalianism, the error of which consisted in believing in the possibility of a material vision of the divine essence.

But if that is the state of things, is there still a deification? Yes, repeats Palamas, thanks to the divine energy, for this *can* be shared. It is, as we can now see, to safeguard the reality of man's deification without falling into the errors we have indicated, that he postulated the distinction between essence and energies.

The energy which is given to man and deifies him is grace. This is what Palamas has set out, first and foremost, to magnify in his writings, claiming for it against his opponents an uncreated and really deifying character, for without this, man's deification would not be effected really but only metaphorically. For this reason the Orthodox liturgy calls Palamas, "the Preacher of Grace."

We shall not find in our author an exact definition of grace, naturally enough in view of the apophatic nature of his theology. Whatever the sense of the word "grace" in his works, and it bears several meanings, deifying grace—the only grace to interest us here, and no mere function or effect of God produced in the soul, but God Himself communicating Himself and uniting Himself in ineffable union with man—is the Divine Light to which we made a brief allusion a moment ago.

Palamas makes of this the central point of his theology, so that Vladimir Lossky can call it wholly and entirely, "The Theology of Light." Why did Palamas do so? Because

the vision of the Divine Light is the goal and the final crowning of all the hesychastic mysticism of the period, a mystical experience to be defended ; and because Holy Scripture, above all the Johannine writings, speak of it very often. The texts are too well-known for me to remind you of them, but the most important scriptural passage in this connection, not in St. John as it happens, is the Transfiguration of Christ on Mount Thabor, whence it comes that the Divine Light is called by a name of equivalent meaning, the Light of Thabor. In addition, Palamas also found the notion of Divine Light in the patristic and liturgical tradition ; and all of this together enables him to understand the word Light not in a metaphorical sense, but in its primary, concrete meaning.

Let us pause for a moment to see the nature of this Light and its effects in man. As with every energy, the Light of Thabor is uncreated, it is the visible part of God. As a matter of history the whole controversy about the hesychast doctrines began on this very point, "a question which may look like Byzantine scholastic hairsplitting to those who are strangers to the religious life," writes Lossky.¹ "But in spite of that, this question included a number of others also, such as the nature of grace, the possibility of mystical experience and its reality, the possibility of seeing God and the nature of this vision, finally, the possibility of a deification in the real, not the metaphorical meaning of the word."

Light as such has at all times belonged to God and hence to Christ from the first moment of His incarnation ; that means that the humanity of Christ was deified by the hypostatic union with the divine nature, that Christ during His earthly life always shone with the divine Light which yet remained invisible for most men. The Transfiguration was not a phenomenon limited in time and space, no change took place at this moment as far as Christ was concerned, not even in His human nature, but a change did take place in the consciousness of the Apostles who received for a moment the faculty of seeing their Master as He was, resplendent with eternal Light, but immediately afterwards this faculty was withdrawn and the shining cloud which hid the sight from them was, according to Palamas, the invisibility of the essence of God. In this way the mystery of the Transfiguration seems to him to give a striking confirmation of the fundamental distinction in God.

¹ Art. cit., p. 109.

So then ; the Light of Thabor is first of all a divine, objective reality, the Kingdom of God ; hence Christ, when announcing His Transfiguration to the Apostles, expresses Himself thus : " Amen, I say to you, that some of those who stand here shall not see death until they see the Kingdom of God coming in power " (Mark viii, 39). The light of Thabor has a special relation with the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is rarely named even though always understood at each moment in the liturgical and spiritual life, because it is not fitting to name the mystery which must be lived in silence ; but if He remains invisible, He manifests Himself in Light.

Although uncreated, is this light also sensible and material as the opponents of Palamas at any rate pretended to believe, or is it merely intelligible ? What we have already said about the Palamite dualism of Creator and creature, leaving far beneath, making scarcely perceptible, the difference between spirit and matter, will already have suggested the answer.

This light or illumination which surpasses both intelligence and senses, is not of an intellectual order (as is often the case with the illumination of the intellect taken in an allegorical and abstract sense), nor is it of a sensible order ; and yet this light fills at once both intelligence and senses !

The *Tomus Hagioriticus*, a Palamite profession of faith dating from about 1340, distinguishes : firstly, the sensible light ; secondly, the light of the intelligence ; and thirdly, the uncreated light, the prototype of these two lights and surpassing them infinitely. After recalling the manner in which man apprehends these two lights, it continues, " Nevertheless, when those who are worthy receive this grace and this spiritual and supernatural power, they perceive both with the senses and with the intellect what is above all sense and all intellect. . . in the way that is known only to God and to those who have experienced this grace."¹

We shall not go into the how of this vision but we shall try to see some effects of this light in man.

* * * * *

Man is deified and filled with the light of Thabor or with the Holy Ghost, according as he makes himself worthy of it and prepares himself for it by his collaboration and his effort of asceticism, because this deification is not a one-sided act of God, but a *συνέργεια* of man with God.

¹ P.G. 150, c. 1233.

It would go beyond the limits of our subject to enter into a detailed study of Palamas's ascetical theology, closely bound up as it is with his anthropology which, in its turn, is entirely dominated by the notion of the whole man, body and soul, the image and likeness of God. We can sum up with Lossky as follows. The goal of the ascetic life is not to be sought in a mortification which will tame the bodily passions, but rather in the acquisition of a new and better energy which will allow both body and mind to share in the life of grace.

According to the *measure*, κατ' ἀναλογίαν, of his deification man acquires a knowledge of God going beyond every intellectual concept, a knowledge which is more like a communion. How far does it go? It is true, we know that the essence of God is unknowable for man, but, Father Cyprian Kern tells us, the mystical knowledge of even a partial truth effects a union with the universal consciousness; man, by means of the divine energies, is in communion with and has a real share in the inaccessible οὐσία, the three hypostases. The same opposition—and to say opposition is to say authentic Palamism!—is pointed out by Lossky. "God reveals and gives Himself completely in His energies and remains absolutely unknowable, incommunicable in His essence."¹

But there is more yet: there is the body itself—and quite logically after what was said earlier—which sees with its eyes the light of Thabor; to this end, the bodily eyes need to be transformed by grace as were those of the Apostles on Mount Thabor. Then is realized literally the sixth Beatitude, "Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see God," and at the same time the heresy of the Messalians is avoided who thought they could see the very essence of God with their bodily eyes. This is a foretaste on earth of the beatific vision which itself is not a vision of the divine essence either; it is the face of the living, personal God, His energy, His Light, which the saints shall behold in the life of the world to come. This point also, if taken as it stands, is contrary to Catholic faith.

Finally the full effect of man's deification in this life is the manifestation of the light which is in him and which is his. Grace since it is light, cannot if it is really present, but manifest itself in the deified man. This fact caused an immediate predecessor of Palamas in Hesychasm, Symeon the New Theologian, to say that a man who does not see God in this

¹ Art. cit., p. 105.

life, will not see Him in the life to come either, a saying which even Mr. Lossky finds a little hard while yet giving it his approval.

The union with God, ever more perfect, should culminate after death and the resurrection, in "the mystery of the eighth day," in that deified state in which "the just shall shine like the sun," as the Gospel has it (Mat. xiii, 43), for they by grace will be all that God is by nature; Palamas is fond of insisting on this: man, by grace, possesses the infinite attributes of God: he is uncreated, omnipotent, etc. Just like the divine Person of the Word who assumed human nature, those human persons, in whom is accomplished the union with God, must needs unite within themselves the created and the uncreated, must needs become, so to say, gods by grace, or better still, persons in two natures; with this difference, that Christ is a divine Person, whereas deified men are and will ever remain created persons, and this they would not remain, as you will remember, if they shared in the divine essence.

There is a human person who reached this plenitude while still in this life and to a degree to which no other creature could attain—and precisely for this reason death could not hold his prey—namely the Mother of God who is "the boundary between created and uncreated being," according to Palamas's own expression.¹

In the same homily on the Dormition, we find this splendid passage: "Desirous of creating an image of absolute beauty and of shewing clearly to angels and men the power of His act, God has in truth made Mary all beautiful. In her He has gathered together all the partial beauties He has distributed to other creatures, and has set her up as the ornament common to all beings visible and invisible; or better still; He has made of her as it were a mingling of all perfections, divine, angelic and human, a sublime beauty, beautifying the two worlds, rising up from earth to heaven and going even beyond this."²

Mary is the perfect hesychast, introduced at the age of three into the Holy of Holies of the Jewish temple to give herself up to ἡσυχία, to silent contemplation, or better, the subject par excellence of the deifying power. She is the concrete justification of the spiritual and mystical process indicated

¹ Homilia XXXVII in sanctissimam dormitionem purissimae Dominae nostrae Deiparae semperque Virginis Mariae, P.G. 151, c. 472 B.

² L.c., c. 468 A.B.

by the text from St. Peter, and towards which the whole of Palamas's theological doctrine strives with an intention at any rate, worthy of all praise.

It is time for us to draw certain conclusions.

IV

Palamas's theology of grace which can quite rightly be called, as Lossky has called it, his theology of Light, is not a theology which makes use of rational concepts to express abstract realities, but is, on the contrary, the apophatic or negative expression of a mystical experience culminating in the beholding of God and eager to acquit itself of the charge of Messalianism. Is it a fact that this defence against the charge of Messalianism was really as decisive in the elaboration of Palamism as Père Jugie and Père Guichardan believe? We must leave that to the decision of a historian more competent than we are.

I have for this reason deliberately omitted any discussion of the philosophical support of this theology (Aristotelianism, Platonism), which has only served to cloud the real vistas of certain investigators, for example, the Russian scholar Th. Uspensky. Palamas aims exclusively at being a theologian finding his inspiration in Holy Scripture and the holy Fathers, and uses philosophical terms only with great reluctance and mostly in the apologetical part of his writings. I believe that Père Jugie is thoroughly right when he sees in the Palamite controversy primarily a conflict between opposing theological methods. "Two methods or two ways for arriving at a knowledge of God met and faced one another here; one, a scientific method drawing its principles both from a sound philosophy and from the sources of Revelation interpreted by the ancient doctors, and clinging to these principles; the other, a mystical method directed towards the experience of contemplatives devoted to the hesychastic life."¹ Mgr. Ehrhard also wrote that his controversy was also at rockbottom the struggle between sober, rational western scholasticism and extravagant eastern theosophical mysticism.²

As a theologian Palamas aims at being perfectly traditional. Does he succeed? The Orthodox say he succeeds completely, to such an extent that according to Vladimir Lossky: "It is

¹ *Theologia Dogmatica Christianorum Orientalium*, II, p. 57.

² K. Krumbacher, A. Ehrhard, H. Gelzer: *Geschichte der Byzantinischen Literatur*, 2 ed., Munich 1897, p. 101.

very difficult to separate the personal doctrine of St. Gregory Palamas from the common patrimony of the Orthodox Church, and that for two reasons : firstly, because Orthodox theology is, in a certain sense, a common task, belonging to all the sons of the Church and rooted in the experience of all according to the measure of each one's spiritual gifts ; secondly, because the very aim of Palamas's work was a dogmatic expression of the foundation of that mystical life which is proper to the Orthodox Church."¹ Father Cyprian Kern has written in Russian a most interesting article on Palamas wholly devoted to "The Spiritual Ancestors of St. Gregory Palamas. An Attempt at a Mystical Genealogy," to demonstrate the really traditional character of his author"² Father Basil uses still other arguments to defend Palamas against the charge of innovation often made against him by Catholic theologians : would it have been possible for Palamas to innovate in such a traditionalist theological milieu as Byzantium, even were it only, in the dogmatic sphere, since in the Orthodox Church dogma and mystical experience are closely interwoven ?

At the same time, however, all the Orthodox agree in finding something new in Palamas as compared with his predecessors, making him something more than a mere codifier. The legitimate development, they say, comes from an authentic mystical intuition enabling him to define exactly his fundamental distinction already glimpsed by the ancient Greek Fathers. "The individual character of his teaching," writes Lossky, "is above all due to the special emphasis he lays on certain points of doctrine which are nevertheless met with in others of the Fathers, and also perhaps to his bold clear-cut way of stating problems which quite surpass any human understanding."³

The authors of the *Tomus Hagioriticus* explain their attitude as follows : In the Old Testament are to be found so to say mysteries it is impossible to express clearly. In the same way for us, in this age of the Gospel in which we live, they say, the things of the world to come, the mysteries, cannot be fully known or rather experienced except by the saints, by those that is to say who live in perfect union with God, transformed by grace, and belonging more to the future life than to this earthly one. In other words, we are here in the presence of a

¹ Art. cit., p. 113, and a similar text, p. 96.

² *Bogoslovskaja Mysl (Theological Thought)*, Paris, 1942, pp. 102-131.

³ Art. cit., p. 96.

further unfolding of revealed truth, even of a kind of super-revelation, as Père Guichardan has it, made through the intermediary of mystics. Historians, above all Orthodox ones, find resemblances between the Trinitarian controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries and the Palamite controversy ; in both it is a real distinction in God which is attacked and defended. Father Basil Krivoshein even goes so far as to liken Palamas to Athanasius warring against the modern Sabellians among whom, I suppose, would be all Catholics !

At the time of the Palamite controversy, to emphasize the aspect of traditional newness, of dogmatic development assumed by the doctrine being put forward, an attempt was made to link it up with the definition of the Sixth Œcumenical Council on the two energies in Christ, arguing as follows : " The Council proclaims two natures and two operations in Christ ; if the human operation is really distinct from the human nature, the divine operation must be really distinct from the divine nature otherwise the terms of the definition would no longer be valid."¹

We already know that this " dogmatic development " came to its natural close in a dogmatic definition at the Council of Constantinople in 1352 with the anathematizing of all who should deny it, and in the canonization of Gregory Palamas in 1368. According to the Orthodox, at any rate the majority of those of our day, Palamas's attempt to justify the hesychast experience—in which according to Father Basil Krivoshein, " is communicated to us immediately the Divine and the Uncreated "—in spite of his extreme reluctance as a mystic to do so, has completely succeeded from every point of view, a success which makes of him a great Doctor of the Church.

* * * * *

What must a Catholic think of all this ?

First of all, it seems undeniable that, once his premisses granted, Palamas's system, essentially religious and mystic in character, holds together perfectly and offers only one weak point, concerning the hypostatic union in Christ, which we cannot deal with here : but, what objection could hold out against an apophatic *non possumus* ? As for the premisses, these require a most attentive examination.

Those Catholic theologians who, though studying Palamism most conscientiously, as for example Père Jugie, have applied to it the categories of normal Catholic philosophy and theology

¹ Jugie, l.c., c. 1763.

have judged it very harshly. We heard a sample of such judgments earlier on. But was this really the right way to set about arriving at a fair judgment? I am asking a question and I can do no more than just hint at an answer, using for this purpose the modern Orthodox outlook on Palamas, too often completely unknown to Catholics, even specialists, and which I have for that very reason tried to explain to you.

To do this, I shall divide the problem into three parts, disregarding the points definitely opposed to Catholic teaching which I have noted in passing and on which the disagreement might quite well turn out to be much less violent on closer examination.

Firstly, the mystical experience which is at the basis of all Palamism has not figured directly in our study. In so far as certain of its elements have been examined we have been able to see in it the key-note of *vision* which is characteristic of the whole Greek mystical tradition. If Père Jugie finds it adulterated, Father Hausherr, a greater authority in the spiritual field, who began with the same views, has gradually come to revise his judgment and now passes a more favourable one.¹

Secondly, is not Palamas's apophatic theology, which Jugie considers inferior and anthropomorphic, in the traditional line of Greek theology since its struggle with Eunomian rationalism? Father Cyprian Kern tries to prove this, I feel with considerable success, by drawing deeply on the theology inherent in the Byzantine liturgy. Is it not characteristic of the Greek theological manner to have given the name of "the New Theologian" to the great Byzantine mystic of the eleventh century, Symeon, the old theologian or divines being St. John the Apostle and St. Gregory Nazianzene? All students of Greek theology know the fine work of Père de Régnon, S. J., on the dogma of the Trinity and will perhaps remember his keen-sighted pages dealing with the Greek method in theology, which, differing in this from the scholastic method, does not arrange according to their greater or lesser gnoseological value the images, the created analogies, it uses to probe the divine mystery.² They seem to the Greek almost indistinguishably good or bad for illustrating an absolutely transcendent reality. To Père Jugie's mind, they would

¹ Cf. *Les Grand Courants de la Spiritualité Orientale. Orientalia Christiana Periodica*, 1935, t. II, p. 114-138.

² *Etudes de Théologie Positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, e.g. I, pp. 441, 489; III, p. 477; IV, pp. 153, 385, etc.

be a little too anthropomorphic also—his estimate in so far seems to us a little sketchy and even superficial.

Thirdly, I believe Palamas's patristic sources should be studied more attentively. I feel that Orthodox theologians are right in their reproach that Père Jugie gets off rather cheaply by bringing down to the level of pure metaphor or rhetoric, expressions favourable to Palamism which might very well have a real value in its favour. Recently Père Daniélou, S.J., published a book called *Théologie mystique et platonisme. Une étude de S. Grégoire de Nysse*,¹ and one is struck in the reading of certain passages on the nature of God by the likeness of the doctrine to that of Palamas.

Does not this give us a very clear hint that if, when judging Palamism, we broaden our theological standards by means of a better patristic study, as Lossky pointed out recently and as is only fitting in common fairness, we can reach results far more reassuring for the cause of Reunion?

Of course, even if the Palamite distinction turned out to be to a certain extent defensible and could be admitted as a theological opinion, a Catholic theologian could never recognize it as a dogma or even as fit to be defined by the *magisterium*. Here Père Guichardan's conclusion seems to me quite right. While finding certain resemblances between the Palamite distinction and the formal distinction *a parte rei* of Duns Scotus, he points out that this has never among Catholics gone farther than the opinion of a certain school of thought, while the other has acquired in the Orthodox Church an exaggerated authority.¹

Finally, I feel that a Catholic cannot help being struck by a very apposite remark of Lossky's on the rôle of Palamism in the Orthodox Church, a remark therefore important for that understanding towards which must ever tend a Catholic worker in this domain who really hopes for Reunion.

Palamism is at the bottom, if not formally at least materially, of all Orthodox religious experience. Thanks to Mr. Dobbie-Bateman's translation, the British public knows about the transfiguration of the Russian ascetic Seraphim of Sarov. "It would be unlikely to suppose that St. Seraphim of Sarov possessed a really deep knowledge of the theological teachings of St. Gregory Palamas on the nature of the Uncreated Light," writes Lossky, "still in him five centuries after the 'Palamite Councils,' in a very different cultural setting from that of

¹ Op. cit., p. 213.

Byzantium, in an isolated spot in the Russian countryside in the first quarter of the nineteenth century, we find the same 'Theology of Light' vindicated by his experience, plainly affirmed as the foundation and norm of the mystic life, of all knowledge of grace, which is in its turn nothing but God Himself revealing Himself to us."¹

If, at the end of this exposition, I have succeeded in convincing my hearers of the importance and the complexity of the Palamite problem in the work for Reunion, an importance at which I hinted in my introduction, I am amply rewarded for my pains. God grant that His true Light may, by solving this problem, enable us Orthodox and Catholics, anxious for a union in truth and love, to succeed in the task, without for that losing our own distinctive sights but, on the contrary, preserving intact the legitimate and real distinction but not separation—it seems to be something like the Palamite distinction! . . . between the traditions of Christian East and Christian West. Is that not the wish and the prayer of us all?

DOM CLEMENT LIALINE.

APPENDIX

The next issue (April—June) will be mainly concerned with the problem of Russia. But we must here and now make our protest against the persecution of the Catholic Ukrainians of the Byzantine rite by the U.S.S.R., in which the Patriarch of Moscow is involved. The Holy Father has just brought out the Encyclical, *Orientales Omnes Ecclesias* dealing with this.

We hope to be able to publish a letter from Dom Gregory Dix in reply to the Orthodox reviewer of his book.

OBITUARY

As we go to press news has come through of the death of His Holiness Benjamin I, the Œcumenical Patriarch of Constantinople, may his soul rest in peace and may God protect his Church and the whole Orthodox Communion.

¹ Art. cit., p. 116.

BOOKS RECEIVED

La Societè D'Archeologie Copte (Cairo): *History of the Patriarchs of the Egyptian Church*, by Yassa Abd Al-Masih and O. H. E. Burmester.

S.P.C.K. :

The Orb and the Cross, by A. R. Vidler.

The Russians and their Church, by N. Zernov.

Eighteenth Century Piety, by W. K. Lowther Clarke.

Browne and Nolan (Dublin) :

A Tribute to Newman.

The Abbè Edgeworth, by M. V. Woodgate.

The Devin-Adair Co. (New York) : *Eastern Catholic Worship*, by D. Attwater.

Priory Press, Ltd. (Cardiff) : *What you see in a Greek Orthodox Church*, by Rev. T. Papadopoulos.

The Dacre Press : *The Soul's Betrothal Gift*, by Hugh of St. Victor.

S.C.M. Press : *Mother of Carmel*, by E. Allison Peers.

The Bruce Publishing Co., Milwaukee: *Augustine's Quest of Wisdom*, by Vernon J. Bourke.

Sheed & Ward : *John Henry Newman*, by John Moody.

REVIEWS

Dieu Vivant. Editions du Seuil, Paris.

Theological Studies. Woodstock, Md., U.S.A.

Theology. S.P.C.K.

Blackfriars. Blackwell, Oxford.

La Revue Nouvelle. Casterman, Tournai.

Reunion. Baxter's Press, Oxford.